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ABSTRACT
Over the next decade an increasing number of new “pharmacotherapy”
medications will become available with the potential to tremendously impact the use
and abuse of illegal drugs and the overall direction of national and international drug
policy. These pharmacotherapy medications are designed to block or significantly
reduce the “highs” elicited by illegal drugs. Used as part of a drug treatment
program, pharmacotherapy medications may provide valuable assistance for people
voluntarily seeking a chemical aid in limiting or eliminating problem drug use.
However, the tremendously politicized nature of the “drug war” raises substantial
concerns that, in addition to those who voluntarily choose to use such medications,
some people will be compelled to use them. This article concludes that in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, governmental action forcing or coercing a
person to use a pharmacotherapy drug would violate a number of important legal
rights. Among the rights implicated by compulsory use of pharmacotherapy drugs
are the right to informed consent, the right to bodily integrity and privacy, the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to freedom of thought.
I. INTRODUCTION
With funding and other encouragement provided by the United States Federal
Government, pharmaceutical companies are developing a new breed of drugs
specifically intended to diminish or entirely block the effects of illegal drugs. The
aim of these new “pharmacotherapy” drugs is to inhibit at the biochemical level the
very ability of a person to experience the psychotropic effects of certain illegal
drugs. Section II examines various factors that raise a reasonable concern that these
pharmaceuticals will migrate from voluntary use to compulsory use within certain
population segments. Section III of this article begins with an overview of these new
drugs: how they work, who is designing and marketing them, and how they may
benefit those seeking a chemical aid in limiting problem drug use. Section IV
identifies and discusses a number of constitutional and other legal issues that will
arise should use of these drugs be mandated for some people.
II. FROM DEMAND REDUCTION TO DESIRE REDUCTION
The United States is currently leading the world in an all out “war on drugs.”
The modern version of this war was declared on June 17, 1971, when former United
States President Richard Nixon called on Congress to approve the Special Action
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Office of Drug Abuse Prevention that would consolidate Federal resources against
“America’s public enemy number one.” Nixon declared that, “[I]n order to fight and
defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.”2 The ambitious
goal of the drug war is to eradicate all use of illegal drugs, giving rise to “Drug-Free
Workplaces,”3 “Drug-Free Borders,”4 “Drug-Free Families,”5 “Drug-Free
Communities,”6 and ultimately a “Drug-Free America.”7
On June 17, 1971, President Nixon requested a $155,655,000 budget to wage the
war on drugs for the 1972 fiscal year.8 Thirty-three years later, the federal budget
requested for the war on drugs reached $12.6 billion dollars for the 2005 fiscal year.9
Despite the federal government’s dedication to its task and heavy-handed threats of
imprisonment, fines, property forfeiture, loss of employment, and even removal of
one’s children, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) estimates that 19.5 million Americans (age twelve or older) defy the law
each month by using an illegal drug.10
Even with widespread violation of the drug prohibition laws and amidst rising
national and international recognition of the folly of fighting a “war” on drugs, the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has vowed not to “punt on
the third down.”11 Alongside efforts to reduce the supply and demand of illegal
drugs, the federal government has begun pursuing a new tactic, one that expands the
drug war battlefield from the Colombian coca farms and the Middle Eastern poppy
fields to a new terrain directly inside the bodies and brains of drug users.
In this new extension of the drug war termed “pharmacotherapy,” the federal
government is partnering with large and small pharmaceutical companies to develop
2

President Richard Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control, (June 17, 1971), in 3 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Richard Nixon 202 (1971), available at http://www.nixonfoundation.org/Research_
Center/PublicPapers.cfm?BookSelected=1971#P584_18482.
3

Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-07 (2005).

4

Drug-Free Borders Act of 2001, S. 92, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Senator Phil
Gramm).
5

Drug-Free Families Act of 2001, S. 89, 107th Cong. §131 (2001).

6

21 U.S.C. § 1521 (2005).

7

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1998).

8

Peter B. Goldberg & James V. DeLong, Federal Expenditures on Drug-Abuse Control, in
DEALING WITH DRUG ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1972), http://www.
druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/dwda/staff5.htm (last visited June 20, 2005).
9

Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Summary: FY 2005 National Drug Control Budget
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgets
um04/budget_highlights.pdf.
10
Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Admin.: Office of Applied Studies, Results
from the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, DHHS Publ’n
No. SMA 03–3836, NSDUH Series H-22 (2003).
11
Let’s Don’t Punt on the Third Down (Commonwealth Club of California radio
broadcast, February 12, 2002) (DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson commenting), transcript
available at http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-02hutchinson-speech.html.
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a new breed of pharmaceutical drugs designed to padlock the brains of drug users so
that even if a person ingests an illegal drug, the drug will be intercepted within the
blood stream or otherwise blocked from entering the brain. The American
Government’s hope is that demand for illegal drugs can be reduced, in part, by
chemically eliminating the very desire to use an illegal drug.
III. PHARMACOTHERAPY DRUGS
The pharmacotherapy drugs that are the subject of this paper fall into one of three
general classes: brain receptor blockers; molecule binders; or metabolism modifiers.
The first class of drugs works by entering specific drug receptor sites on the
surfaces of brain cells or neurons, thereby blocking illegal drug molecules from
plugging into those receptor sites. Of these blockers, there are three basic types:
agonists, partial agonists, and antagonists. Agonists are compounds that bind to
receptors and produce significant physiological activity.12 Partial agonists are
compounds that bind to receptors, but cause a relatively small amount of activation.13
Antagonists are compounds that enter receptor sites, but do not produce any
physiological activity; they simply block the receptors.14 All of these compounds
work by occupying receptor sites on the surfaces of neurons, thereby preventing
molecules of the illegal drug from docking and producing their psychotropic effects.
In addition to receptor blocking compounds that act upon the neurotransmitter
system, the second class of pharmacotherapy drugs works within the bloodstream,
binding to an illegal drug molecule and thereby making it too large to pass through
the blood-brain barrier.15 Because the illegal molecule is then unable to make it into
the brain, it is prevented from producing any psychotropic effects.
The final class of pharmacotherapy drugs alters the metabolism of certain target
drugs, thereby causing a build up of toxic metabolic products that make a person feel
extremely ill.16 The best known of these metabolism-modifiers is Antabuse®
(disulfiram), a drug primarily used to discourage people from drinking alcohol.
A. Target: Opiates
Some pharmacotherapy drugs that block or reduce the effects of psychotropic
drugs are already available. The best known is an agonist named methadone, which
was initially developed as a long-acting analgesic. Methadone has been used for
over thirty years as a government-sanctioned substitute for heroin and other illegal
opiates. Methadone occupies the same opioid receptor site as heroin, but whereas
heroin produces a significant feeling of euphoria, methadone, when used orally as
prescribed, reportedly produces little euphoria. A methadone user who takes a
typical street dose of heroin will feel practically no effect from the heroin because
the methadone will have already entered the brain’s opioid receptor sites thus
blocking the heroin from entering. Additionally, by occupying opioid receptor sites,
12

STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 37 (27th Ed. 2000).

13

Id.

14

Id., “antagonist.”

15

See for example, discussion of “TA-CD,” infra, pp. 221.

16

See, infra pp. 225.
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methadone substantially reduces the unpleasant effects associated with heroin
withdrawal.
Another drug currently used to treat heroin addiction is naltrexone. This drug
was created by DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Corporation and has been available
for use since the 1980s. Unlike methadone, which produces mild pleasurable effects,
naltrexone is an antagonist that blocks the brain’s receptors for heroin and other
opiates and does not produce any pleasurable effects. When initially marketed as a
treatment for heroin and other opiate addiction, it was named Trexan®. In 1994, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also approved the use of
naltrexone for alcohol addicts. Naltrexone is currently sold under the trade name
“reVia,” for the treatment of alcohol addiction.17
DuPont has encountered several hurdles in marketing naltrexone to heroin and
alcohol addicts. Presently, naltrexone is used by less than one percent of selfreported opiate addicts.18 There are a number of reasons why naltrexone has not
been a popular medicine. The brain’s receptors cannot be labeled as “good” or
“bad,” or as “government approved” versus “unapproved.” The opioid receptors
play multiple roles, from pain reduction to euphoria production. Naltrexone fills the
brain's opioid receptors indiscriminately, which means it cannot tell an illegal opiate
(like heroin) from a legal opiate painkiller such as Vicodin® (hydrocodone). As a
result, a person taking naltrexone is placed in the precarious position of not being
amenable to conventional opiate-based painkillers. For this reason, people taking
naltrexone are advised to carry a card with them at all times, advising emergency
medical personnel that the most common medications used to treat serious pain will
have little or no effect on them.19 Second, naltrexone cannot be given until after a
17
See Barr Pharmaceutical’s Product Guide, available at http://www.barrlabs.com/product
guide.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
18

Clifford Goodman et al., Market Barriers to the Development of Pharmacotherapies for
the Treatment of Cocaine Abuse and Addiction: Final Report (The Lewin Group, 1997),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/cocaine/final.htm (last visited June 20, 2005).
19

The “Naltrexone Safety Identification Card” that DuPont provides reVia users states:

TO MEDICAL PERSONNEL TREATING ME IN AN EMERGENCY: This patient
is taking the oral opioid antagonist reVia®, formerly known as Trexan® (naltrexone
hydrochloride).
In an emergency situation with patients receiving fully blocking doses of reVia®, a
suggested plan of management is regional anesthesia, conscious sedation with a
benzodiapine, use of non-opioid analgesics, or general anesthesia. In a situation
requiring opioid analgesia, the amount of opioid required may be greater than usual
and the resulting respiratory depression may be deeper and more prolonged. A rapidly
acting opioid analgesic that minimizes the duration of respiratory depression is
preferred. The amount of analgesia administered should be titrated to the needs of the
patient. Non-receptor mediated actions may occur and should be expected (e.g., facial
swelling, itching, generalized erythemia, or bronchoconstriction), presumably due to
histamine release. Irrespective of the drug chosen to reverse reVia® (naltrexone
hydrochloride) blockade, the patient should be monitored closely by appropriately
trained personnel in a setting equipped and staffed for cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
For medical emergencies, call your regional Poison Control Center. Further
information may be obtained by calling: 1-800-4PHARMA.
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patient is fully detoxified from opiates. If an active opiate user takes naltrexone, it
will precipitate sudden and violent withdrawal.20
Another problem for the marketers of naltrexone was recently uncovered by
researchers testing the drug on marijuana smokers. To the researchers’ surprise,
people who were given naltrexone and then smoked marijuana reported that they felt
greater psychotropic effects from the marijuana than if they had simply smoked
marijuana alone.21 In other words, while naltrexone blocks the psychotropic effects
of alcohol, heroin, and opium, it appears to increase the effects of marijuana.
In October 2002, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved two new medications for treating opiate addiction, both developed by
Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals. The new drugs, Subutex® (buprenorphine
hydrochloride) and Suboxone® tablets (buprenorphine hydrochloride and naloxone
hydrochloride), contain buprenorphine, a partial opioid agonist.22 Like methadone,
buprenorphine binds to the brain’s opioid receptors, but produces significantly
reduced pleasurable effects than heroin.
Subutex and Suboxone are unique not so much for their chemical makeup or
mode of operation, but for the regulatory hurdles they overcame. Unlike other
pharmacotherapies for heroin addiction (e.g., methadone, naltrexone, ORLAAM23),
which can only be dispensed by specialized “Opioid Treatment Clinics,” speciallytrained doctors are permitted to prescribe Subutex and Suboxone drugs in a standard
office setting under the Drug Addiction Treatment Act (DATA) of 2000.24

20
V.W. Tornabene, Narcotic Withdrawal Syndrome Caused by Naltrexone, in 81:6
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 785-7 (1974).
21

M. Haney, A. Bisaga, & R.W. Foltin, Interaction Between Naltrexone and Oral THC in
Heavy Marijuana Smokers, in 166(1) PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (BERL.) 77-85 (2003), abstract
available at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00213/contents/02/01279/s00213-0021279-8ch002.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
22

See product website at http://www.suboxone.com/patients/suboxone (last visited Nov.
19, 2006).
ORLAAM® (Levomethadyl hydrochloride acetate) is a synthetic opioid agonist that was
approved by the FDA for the management of opiate dependence in 1995. After receiving
increasing number of reports of severe heart problems associated with use of ORLAAM, it
was removed from the European market in 2001. In August 2003, Roxane Laboratories, the
manufacturers of ORLAAM, announced that it would be discontinuing the sale and
distribution of ORLAAM “after the current inventory is depleted.” See letter from Michael
Schobelock, Assoc. Director, Medical Affairs Dep’t, Roxane Laboratories, to Healthcare
Professional [Community] (August 23, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
shortages/orlaam.htm.
23

24

United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA): Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Subutex (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride) Suboxone Tablets (Buprenorphine
Hydrochloride and Naloxone Hydrochloride), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/info
page/subutex_suboxone/default.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
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B. Target: Cocaine
With an estimated two million people in the United States using cocaine at least
once a month,25 a number of pharmaceutical companies are working to develop drugs
that will block the effects of cocaine. The National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA)
has allocated $12 million to a five-year test of a “cocaine vaccine” currently known
only as “TA-CD.”26 The drug is being developed by Xenova, a pharmaceutical
company, and works inside the body by attaching itself to cocaine molecules and
rendering them too large to pass through the blood-brain barrier.
In an early test, TA-CD was injected into mice, which were then fed cocaine.
According to the researchers, none of the cocaine entered the brains of the mice.
With periodic boosters, the “vaccine” reportedly remained effective for more than a
year.27
In 1999, TA-CD was tested on human subjects. Volunteers were injected with
the “cocaine vaccine” once a week for four weeks and, according to researchers,
“antibody responses” lasted almost three months without any adverse affects. In
October of 2003, Xenova began testing TA-CD in a randomized, placebo-controlled
clinical trial involving 132 human subjects.28
Another anti-cocaine drug is under development by DrugAbuse Sciences, Inc., a
California company whose business plan is built solely upon developing
pharmacotherapy drugs. DrugAbuse Sciences is racing to develop “DAS-431,” a
“cocaine vaccine” that the company aims to release in both an injectable form as
well as an inhalable aerosol.29

25

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Office of
Applied Studies, 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Detailed Tables, Table 1.21A,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/Sect1peTabs1to66.htm#tab1.21a (last visited Nov.
19, 2006).
26
The term “vaccine” is used by Xenova to describe TA-CD. The company’s website
description of TA-CD states: “Xenova is developing a therapeutic vaccine, TA-CD, for the
treatment of cocaine dependence, for which there is no currently available effective treatment.
. . . TA-CD is designed to induce cocaine-specific antibodies which bind to cocaine in the
blood, blocking its uptake into the brain. Therefore, the human physiological response to
cocaine is altered, reducing the reinforcing properties of cocaine and permitting patients to
break the cycle of addiction and abuse. The active ingredient of the TA-CD vaccine is a
protein conjugate: a cocaine derivative coupled to recombinant cholera toxin B (rCTB). The
finished TA-CD vaccine consists of the protein conjugate adsorbed onto aluminum hydroxide
gel adjuvant in saline. The vaccine is administered by intramuscular injection and it is
anticipated that a short course of injections will be required to induce antibody responses.”
Xenova Group plc, TA-CD: Background, http://www.xenova.co.uk/dc_ta_cd.html (last visited
June 14, 2005).
27

Patrick Zickler, Blood-borne Medications Could Intercept Drugs Before They Reach the
Brain, in 14 NIDA NOTES 2 (1999), http://165.112.78.61/NIDA_Notes/NNVol14N2
/medications.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
28
29

Xenova Group plc, supra note 26.

DrugAbuse Sciences, New Products in Development, available at http://www.drug
abusesciences.com/products.asp (last visited June 20, 2005).
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C. Target: Marijuana
A number of pharmaceutical companies are working to develop drugs that will
block the marijuana “high” sought by the world’s estimated 162 million regular
marijuana users.30 In 1988, researchers identified the receptors in the brain to which
the marijuana molecule attaches. Named “Cannabinoid Receptor 1” (CB1), it
became the site of intensive scientific research, subsequently leading to the discovery
that the brain naturally produces several compounds that fit the CB1 receptors. One
of these natural compounds was named “anandamide” from “ananda,” the Sanskrit
word for “bliss.”
CB1 receptors are “extraordinarily abundant in the brain.”31 They are particularly
ubiquitous in the basal ganglia and the cerebellum, which regulate and coordinate
body movements. CB1 receptors are also abundant in the hippocampus, which plays
a central role in learning and memory, and in the cerebral cortex, which is involved
in integrating higher cognitive functions. To a lesser extent CB1 receptors can also
be found in the heart, lung, prostate, uterus, ovary, testis, bone marrow, thymus,
tonsils, and adrenal gland.32
Working with a grant from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA),
scientists have created an anti-marijuana drug that occupies the brain’s CB1
receptors, thereby blocking marijuana from entering its host receptors.33 Created by
the French pharmaceutical firm Sanofi-Synthelabo, and named “SR141716,” the
drug may become the ultimate “buzzkill.”34
In a test conducted in 2002, sixty-three adult males who smoked marijuana after
taking ninety milligrams of SR 141716 reported significant reductions in how “high”
or “stoned” they felt.
Even though blood tests showed that THC
(tetrahydrocannabinol, the primary psychoactive principle in marijuana) was
coursing through their veins, SR141716 was blockading the brain receptors that THC
normally plugs into.35 The subjects reported that SR141716 reduced their marijuana
high by as much as 75 percent.
30

Trends: Consumption – Cannabis, GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2003 (UN Office on
Drugs and Crime: UN Int’l Drug Control Program Research Section, Vienna, Aus.), at 136,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/trends2003_www_E.pdf (last visited June 14, 2005).
31
Institute of Medicine: Division of Neuroscience and Behavioral Health, Chapter 2:
Cannabinoids and Animal Physiology, in MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE
BASE 1.1, 2.9 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999), http://www.rism.org/isg/dlp/ganja/analyses/
Marijuana%20and%20Medicine%202a.html (last visited June 16, 2005).
32

Id. at 2.38.

33

Press Release, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Potential Medication Can Reduce
Effects of Smoke Marijuana in Humans (April 12, 2001), at http://www.drugabuse.gov/
MedAdv/01/NR4-12.html.
34

Patrick Zickler, NIDA NOTES Staff Writer, Cannabinoid Antagonist Reduces
Marijuana’s Effects in Humans Research Findings, in 17(3) NIDA Notes (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol17N3/Cannabinoid.html.
35

Marilyn A. Huestis et al., Blockade of Effects of Smoked Marijuana by the CB1-Selective
Cannabinoid Receptor Antagonist SR141716, in 58(4) JOURNAL ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY, at 322-328 (April 2001), abstract available at http://archpsyc.amaassn.org/cgi/content/abstract/58/4/322.
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Sanofi-Synthelabo believes a different formulation of the compound may also be
effective in blocking the effects of cocaine.36 Sanofi-Synthelabo is set to begin
Phase II clinical trials aimed at determining whether SR141716 might also reduce
the effects and desire for alcohol.37 Under the tradenames “Acomplia” and
“Rimonabant,” the company is working to release the drug as an obesity and antismoking treatment.38
D. Targeting Legal Drugs
1. Target: Nicotine
At last count, approximately 70.8 million people in the United States regularly
use some type of tobacco product.39 The effects of nicotine on the brain are
complex, but it is well established that the drug stimulates the production of
dopamine, a neurotransmitter that produces feelings of pleasure and euphoria.
Cigarette smokers enjoy the pleasurable effects of this legal dopamine surge. An
increasing number of nicotine users, however, are becoming concerned about the
associated health problems; each year two out of three cigarette smokers decide to
try to quit smoking.
For many, quitting smoking does not mean quitting nicotine. The leading
products in the smoking cessation market are Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT)
products, which are available in four different forms: gum, patch, inhaler, and
microtab.40 Products such as Nicorette® gum and the NicoDerm CQ® patch work
by releasing nicotine into the body in a way that is reportedly less harmful than
smoking tobacco. Nicorette’s market dominance is, in part, due to the fact that
although it began as a prescription medication in 1984, the FDA approved it (and
NicoDerm CQ) for over-the-counter sales in 1996. As a result, sales of both
products soared.41
36
Robert Mathias, Study Opens Promising New Approach to Developing Medications To
Prevent Relapse to Cocaine Use, in 17(3) NIDA NOTES (Oct. 2002), http://www.drugabuse.
gov/NIDA_notes/NNVol17N3/Promising.html.
37

See National Institutes of Health, United States Department of Health and Human
Services, Protocol No. 04-AA-0072, Clinical Trial of the Cannabinoid CB1 Receptor
Antagonist, SR141716 (Rimonabant), to Reduce Voluntary Ethanol Drinking in Healthy, NonTreatment Seeking Individuals Who Consume Between 20 and 50 Drinks Per Week (National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism sponsoring the study), available at http://
clinicalstudies. info.nih.gov/detail/A_2004-AA-0072.html (last visited June 14, 2005).
38

Gina Kolata, Will a New Drug Melt the Pounds? It May, but Doctors Urge Caution,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 1, at 1.
39
National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIDA InfoFacts: Cigarettes and Other Nicotine
Products, at http://www.drugabuse.gov/infofacts/tobacco.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
40

GlaxoSmithKline has a website devoted to the Nicorette family of products.
GlaxoSmithKline, http://www.nicorette.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
41

See

According to a 1997 report prepared by United States Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of Health Policy, “Saels in the second quarter of 1996 increased over 100%
from the sales in the first quarter, rising from $37 million to $78 million. During 1996 alone,
the sales from Nicorette supassed $225 million dollars. This figure is comparable to target
peak annual revenues for new drugs of major pharmaceutical companies.” “Case Study:

224

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 19:215

Today, over one-third of Nicorette users report that while they are no longer
addicted to cigarettes; they are now addicted to Nicorette.42 One such Nicorette user
told The New York Times that after giving up cigarettes with the aid of Nicorette, she
then found it exceptionally difficult to quit Nicorette. “I felt almost like a drug
addict,” she said, estimating that the twelve pieces of Nicorette she chewed each day
cost her more than $15,000 over the years, without curing her addiction to nicotine.43
In May 1997, GlaxoSmithKline (then known as Glaxo Wellcome, Inc.) received
FDA approval to market a sustained-release version of the antidepressant
Wellbutrin® (bupropion hydrochloride) to smokers under the name Zyban®.44
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals in Florida is developing what it terms a nicotine
“vaccine.”45 Named NicVAX™ (Nicotine Conjugate Vaccine), the drug stimulates
the human immune system to produce nicotine-specific antibodies that bind to
nicotine molecules in the blood system, blocking nicotine from reaching the brain. A
person who smokes a cigarette after taking NicVAX does not feel any of the
pleasurable effects normally associated with nicotine; as a result, the person’s
interest in smoking should diminish.
When tested in laboratory rats, NicVAX reduced the amount of nicotine reaching
the brain by sixty-four percent.46 It is currently being tested in humans in the United
States and the Netherlands.47
NIDA is taking the “vaccine” moniker literally. In the agency’s NIDA Notes
newsletter, the institute reported that NicVAX might be useful not only for those
people who want to stop smoking, but also as an inoculation for people who have
never smoked. According to NIDA Notes, NicVAX “may even prove useful as an
inoculation against nicotine addiction, much like those that protect children from
tetanus, measles, and polio.”48
Nicorette,” in Market Barriers to the Development of Pharmacotherapies for the Treatment of
Cocaine Abuse and Addiction: Final Report, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/
cocaine/final.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
42

Petra Bartosiewicz, A Quitter’s Dilemma: Hooked on the Cure, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2004, § 3, at 8.
43

Id.

44

See letter from Dep’t of Health & Human Services: Food & Drug Admin., to Glaxo
Wellcome (May 14, 1997) (on file with author), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/
97/20711_ZYBAN,%20100MG%20AND%20150MG_APPROV.PDF.
45

See Nabi Biopharmaceuticals, Key Facts about Nicotine Addiction and NicVAX™,
http://www.nabi.com/pdf/pipe_nicotine_nicvax.pdf (last visited July 22, 2004).
46
Press Release, Nabi Bioharmaceuticals, Nicotine Vaccine Date for Nabia-NicVAX
Published in Peer Review Journal (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://yoko001.hp.infoseek.co.
jp/vaccine/mecha/purpose/merit/media/list/NabiPress.htm.
47

Press Release, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals, Nabi BioPharmaceuticals Initiates NicVAX™
Phase II Trial, Investigational Vaccine for the Prevention and Treatment of Nicotine Addiction
(Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=100445&p=irolnewsArticle &ID=438522&highlight=.
48
Barbara Shine, Nicotine Vaccine Moves Toward Clinical Trials, in 15(5) NIDA NOTES
(Oct. 2000), available at http://165.112.78.61/NIDA_Notes/NNVol15N5/Vaccine.html (last
visited June 16, 2005).
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2. Target: Alcohol
In the 1940s, workers at a rubber plant became violently ill after drinking
alcohol. The cause of the illness was traced to tetraethylthiuram disulfide (aka
disulfiram), a chemical used in the manufacturing plant.49 The discovery led to a
new “treatment” for excessive alcohol use. Marketed under the trade name
Antabuse® by the Wyeth-Ayerst Company, disulfiram prevents the body from
properly eliminating alcohol, thereby causing a toxic accumulation of acetaldehyde
in a drinker’s blood.50 When acetaldehyde builds up in the body, it causes a person
to feel violently ill. A person who takes Antabuse and subsequently drinks alcohol
will, within about fifteen minutes, experience a pounding headache, shortness of
breath, violent vomiting, blurred vision, chest pain, and dizziness.51 Symptoms
usually disappear within sixty minutes, but can last for up to four hours. The
Physicians Desk Reference lists “death” as a possible reaction when alcohol is
consumed by a person taking Antabuse, and reports of actual deaths do exist.52
Because Antabuse causes toxic concentrations of acetaldehyde whenever any
alcohol is present, the consumption of any alcohol-containing medicines (cough
syrup, flu medicines, mouthwash, etc.) or alcohol-containing foods can produce
adverse reactions.53 Even alcohol absorbed through the skin, such as through the use
of aftershaves, perfumes or shampoos, can trigger negative reactions.54
E. Pharmacotherapy Drugs: Good, Bad, Both, or Beyond?
For people who decide that their use of a psychotropic drug is becoming
problematic, pharmacotherapy drugs such as Zyban, naltrexone, or SR141716 may
provide much desired assistance in quitting or reducing drug use. While some
people working in the drug treatment field are opposed to “using one drug to treat
another” most people have welcomed the development of these new medicines. For
people who find that their use of drugs is causing problems in their lives, future
pharmacotherapy drugs may provide safe and effective tools for ending or reducing
excessive or harmful drug use. The development of these drugs should be
encouraged and their voluntary use supported.
Yet, the development of pharmacotherapy drugs – like drug prohibition itself —
is driven at least as much by politics, power, and profits than by genuine public

49

“Antabuse,” THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2005), available at http://www.
bartelby.com/65/an/Antabuse.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
50
See Odyssey Pharmaceticals, Inc., How Does Antabuse Work? http://www.antabuse.
com/productTable.asp?id=16.
51

PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 594 (33rd ed., 1979).

52

Id. See also R. Fox, Disulfiram-Alcohol Side Effects (Letter to the Editor), 204 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 271 (1968); see also C.A. Cahill, Safety of Disulfiram, 287(18) NEW ENG. J.
MED. 935-36 (1972).
53
R.S. Koff et al., Alcohol in Cough Medicines Hazard to Disulfiram User (Letter to the
Editor), 215 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1988 (1971).
54

See The Carlat Report on Psychiatric Treatment, Antabuse (disulfram) Fact Sheet,
http://www.thecarlatreport.com/fact_sheets/antabuse.php (last visited June 21, 2005).
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health concerns.55 If health concerns justified criminal prohibition, then cigarettes
and alcohol would be illegal. Use of cigarettes is estimated to kill in excess of
440,000 people each year in the United States.56 Dr. Alan Leshner, while serving as
the head of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, said that “[t]he use of tobacco
products may be the Nation’s most critical public health problem.”57 Likewise,
excessive alcohol consumption leads to as many as 85,000 deaths each year,58 an
estimated 27,485 of which are just from alcohol-induced cirrhosis of the liver.59
Marijuana stands in stark contrast to alcohol and nicotine, in just about every
respect. Marijuana is the most commonly used illegal drug in the world, regularly
used by an estimated 144 million people worldwide.60 According to United States
Government statistics, 40.4 percent of Americans have tried marijuana during their
lifetime.61 It is one of the most studied drugs in history, and is regarded by many
55

See PHARMACIA CORPORATION, PHARMACIA, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 24, available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/PHA/reports/ar2001.pdf. The development of
pharmacotherapy medications for legal drugs like alcohol and nicotine, is driven primarily by
profit motives. In 2001, Pharmacia, acquired by Pfizer in 2003, advised investors that,
“Nicorette currently controls about half of the worldwide smoking cessation market” with
sales in 2001 of $299 million. See also Press Release, Decision Resources, The Market for
Smoking Cessation Therapies Will More Than Triple Over the Next Ten Years, Predicts
Decision Resources (June 10, 1998), available at http://www.forces.org/articles/files/
pharma.htm (referencing a 1998 study valuing the “smoking cessation market” at $450 million
and predicting it will reach nearly $1.5 billion by 2007).
56
The Center for Disease Control (CDC): Nat’l Ctr. For Chronic Disease Prevention &
Health Promotion, Tobacco Information and Prevention Source (TIPS), http://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/issue.htm.
57

NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH REPORT SERIES: NICOTINE ADDICTION,
Publ’n No. 01-4342 (1998), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/researchreports/nicotine/
nicotine.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
58

Ali H. Mokdad, PhD et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291(10) J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1241 (Mar. 10, 2004), corrected in 293(3) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 298,
298 (Jan. 19, 2005).
59
Young-Hee Yoon, PhD et al., Surveillance Report # 63: Liver Cirrhosis Mortality in the
United States, 1970-2000 1 (2004), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/
surveillance63/cirr00.htm (last visited June 20, 2005). See also Nat’l Institute on Alcohol
Abuse & Alcoholism, 10th Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health 24
ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 3 (2000), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh241/toc24-1.htm (last visited June 20, 2005) (reporting that alcohol also has deleterious effects
on other body systems including the brain, the immune system, and the cardiovascular
system).
60
61

Trends: Consumption – Cannabis, supra note 30, at 136.

The number of Americans twelve years and older who used marijuana in 2003
(25,231,000) is greater than the entire population of Texas as of 2000 (20,851,820).
SAMHSA, OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG
USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES: TABLE 1.1A ILLICIT DRUG USE IN LIFETIME, PAST YEAR,
AND PAST MONTH AMONG PERSONS AGED 12 OR OLDER: NUMBERS IN THOUSANDS, 2002 AND
2003 (2003), http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/NHSDA/2k3tabs/Sect1peTabs1to66
.htm (last visited May 26, 2005); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU REPORT FOR 2000:
SUMMARY FILE 4, http://www.census.gov (last visited June 21, 2005).
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experts as far safer than alcohol. In 1988, Judge Francis Young, Chief
Administrative Law Judge for the DEA at the time, presided over an extensive
hearing on marijuana and concluded:
In strict medical terms marijuana is far safer than many foods we
commonly consume. For example, eating ten raw potatoes can result in a
toxic response. By comparison, it is physically impossible to eat enough
marijuana to induce death. Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the
safest therapeutically active substances known to man.62
While nicotine and alcohol are legal for adult use,63 a person who smokes
marijuana - even an adult in the privacy of his or her own home - commits a federal
crime.64 Even a cancer patient, whose own doctor approves of his or her medical
use, commits a federal crime by using marijuana.65
Given that marijuana has been safely used for centuries, while the anti-marijuana
drug SR141716 has no history of human use, one cannot help but question whether
“the cure” might be worse than “the illness.” Given the abundance of CB1 receptors
in the brain, blocking them indiscriminately with an antagonist like SR141716 may
produce complex physiological and psychological effects that have yet to be
understood or even identified. Further, considering that less than three percent of
marijuana smokers voluntarily seek treatment,66 it is clear that SR141716 is a drug

62
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, IN THE MATTER OF
MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION 58, Docket No. 86-22 (Sept. 6. 1988), available at
http://www.ukcia. org/pollaw/lawlibrary/young.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
63

To be clear, I am not suggesting that cigarettes or alcohol should be prohibited. Alcohol
prohibition was a failure in all respects, again confirming that drug prohibition produces a net
harm for individuals and society. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (U. Ill. Press, 2d ed. 1986); see also
MARK THORNTON, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION WAS A FAILURE (Cato Inst. 1991),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-157.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
64

21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000).

65

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). Although nine states currently provide legal
protections for patients who use marijuana for medical purposes, the federal government is
staunchly opposed to even the medical use of marijuana. The United States Department of
Justice even went so far as to threaten physicians with the loss of their prescribing privileges
for so much as discussing marijuana’s medicinal properties with their patients. However, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that doctors have a First Amendment right to freely
discuss any potentially beneficial treatment, including marijuana, with patients. The United
States Supreme Court, refused to hear the Justice Department’s appeal of the Ninth Circuit
ruling, thereby letting the ruling in favor of doctors and patients stand. Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629. 9th Cir. (2002), certiorari denied, Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).
66

“Marijuana was the second most common illicit drug responsible for treatment
admissions in 2001, accounting for fifteen percent of TEDS admissions”; however, “[m]ore
than half (57 percent) of marijuana admissions were referred to treatment through the criminal
justice system.” SAMHSA, OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, TREATMENT EPISODE DATA SET
(TEDS), 1992-2001: NATIONAL ADMISSIONS TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES
(2003), http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/teds01/TEDS2K1Chp3.htm#Marijuana (last visited Apr.
7, 2006).
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born almost entirely from the fact that the major harm associated with using
marijuana is political in nature rather than medical.
Indeed, experts are increasingly pointing out that the policy of criminal drug
prohibition is responsible for producing medical harm. Take, for example, heroin
(diacetylmorphine), the drug commonly characterized as one of the most damaging
of all illegal drugs. Heroin was created by the Bayer pharmaceutical company in
1895 and was available as an over-the-counter pain medication until 1924. In 1895,
Bayer began production of diacetylmorphine and coined the name “heroin.” In
1898, they introduced it as a commercial substitute for morphine, and it began to
gain fame for helping morphine addicts with their habit. In 1924, the Heroin Act
made manufacture and possession of heroin illegal. The next year, a thriving black
market was operating in New York’s Chinatown.67
Today in the United States, as a result of criminal prohibition, heroin is only
available on the black market and is commonly adulterated with admixtures that
increase the health risks, including the likelihood of overdose.68 Additionally, under
criminal prohibition, most states do not allow heroin users to obtain sterile syringes;
users are left to re-use syringes and share these with other users.69 One result is that
needle sharing among injection drug users is now a major force driving the
HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C epidemics in America.70
67

Heroinaddiction.com, History of Heroin and Opium Timeline, http://www.heroin
addiction.com/heroin_timeline.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
68

Risk of overdose is increased because users have no way of accurately determining the
appropriate dose of street heroin. In February 2005, the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research began a two-year, $8.1 million clinical trial designed to provide pharmaceuticalgrade heroin to 470 habitual heroin users. The Canadian study follows earlier studies in
Switzerland and the Netherlands that found that heroin-assisted therapy reduces both the
individual and social harms associated with chronic heroin use. See Press Release, Canadian
Institutes of Health Research, North America’s First Clinical Trial of Prescribed Heroin
Begins Today (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/26516.html; see also Press Release,
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, The NAOMI Project: Montreal Components of the
Canadian Study Using Medically Prescribed Injection Heroin to be Conducted by the CHUM
(June 6, 2005), available at http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/28330.html.
69

Increasing the availability of sterile syringes through syringe exchange programs,
pharmacies, and other outlets reduces unsafe injection practices such as needle sharing,
curtails transmission of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C, increases safe disposal of used syringes,
and helps heroin users obtain drug information, treatment, and detoxification. See Amy
Smoyer, Needle Exchange “Programs” and Public Policy in Spain (2001), available at
http://cira.med.yale.edu/about_us/smoyerspain.doc (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
70

According for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Since the [HIV]
epidemic began, injection drug use has directly and indirectly accounted for more than onethird (thirty-six percent) of AIDS cases in the United States.” Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, “Drug-Associated HIV Transmission Continues in the United States,”
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ resources/factsheets/idu.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
Between 1992 and 1995, injection drug users accounted for forty-three percent of all
reported hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections and that “‘HCV infection is acquired after
initiation of injection more rapidly than other viral infections, with one study reporting that
fifty percent to eighty percent of new injectors tested positive for anti-HCV within six to
twelve months after beginning injection.’” Miriam J. Alter & Linda A. Moyer, The
Importance of Preventing Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among Injection Drug Users in the
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Perhaps most apropos for the topic of this report, a number of studies suggest that
distributing naloxone hydrochloride to the friends and family of heroin users could
save lives by providing people with an immediate way to treat a heroin overdose.71
Yet, the amount of the federal drug control budget allocated for efforts to supply
naloxone to heroin users and those closest to them for voluntary use in emergency
situations is zero.72 Thus, even with respect to heroin, drug prohibition cannot be
defended as a rational federal policy designed to reduce medical harm.
What any given society, at any given time, views as unacceptable psychotropic
drug use is largely a socio-political construct.73 As aptly noted by the British
Medical Association:
Almost every psychoactive drug known to humanity, from alcohol to
opium, has been regarded by some government and society as a dire threat
to public order and moral standards, and by another government and
another society as a source of harmless pleasure. Further, nations and
governments sometimes change their views completely. Almost every
society has at least one drug whose use is tolerated, while drugs used in
other cultures are generally viewed quite differently and with deep
suspicion. Mexican Indians may have disapproved of alcohol, but they
used mescaline. Most Muslim cultures forbid alcohol, but they tolerate
cannabis and opium.74
That being the case, a nation’s drug control policy becomes a tool for social
control, a tool that can be directed and re-directed at the will of politicians and other
powerful interests. This factor, along with several others discussed in the next
section of this article, suggests that use of pharmacotherapy drugs may not remain
strictly voluntary for long. Rather, certain segments of the population could find use
United States, 18 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES & HUM. RETROVIROLOGY S1,
S6-S10 (1998), abstract at http://www.aegis.com/ news/ads/1998/AD981509.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2006).
71
John Strang, et al., Heroin Overdose: The Case for Take-Home Naloxone, 312 BRIT.
MED. J. 1435-36 (1996), available at, http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/312/7044/
1435 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Shane Darke & Wayne Hall, The Distribution of Naloxone to
Heroin Users, 92(9) ADDICTION 1195-1199 (1997).
72
A handful of cities and states are instituting naloxone distribution programs despite
federal government heel dragging. A new naloxone distribution program in San Francisco is
underway, based on successful programs that have been operating in New Mexico and
Chicago. Others are planned for Baltimore and New York City in the near future. Press
Release, Drug Policy Alliance, San Francisco Begins Distributing Naloxone to Heroin Addicts
(Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.lindesmith.org/news/11_21_03naloxone.cfm.
73
Peter Cohen, Drugs as a Social Construct (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Universiteit van Amsterdam), http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/cohen.drugs.toc.html (last visited
Dec. 5, 2003); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in
America’s Latest Drug Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 18,
20-24 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997); Craig Reinarman et al., Scapegoating
and social control in the construction of a public problem: Empirical and critical findings on
cocaine and work, in 9 RES. L. DEVIANCE & SOC. CONTROL 37-62 (1988).
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BMA Professional and Scientific Division, Living with Risk, in THE BRITISH MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION GUIDE (John Wiley & Sons 1987).
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of these drugs becoming compulsory. If this is the case, these brain-policing drugs
present an emerging threat to individual freedom and civil liberties.
F. From Drug War to Drug Epidemic
Compared to other new pharmaceuticals that enter society and primarily face
marketing challenges, the new pharmacotherapy drugs are unique because of the
highly politicized environment in which they will be introduced. As discussed
above, the development of these drugs cannot be separated from the political
environment.
Since its very inception, the United States Government’s drug policy rhetoric and
enforcement policies have conflated drug use with drug abuse. Research, however,
indicates that the vast majority of people who use illegal drugs, (like the vast
majority of people who use legal drugs) do so without creating problems for
themselves or others.75 Yet, the drug war paints one broad stroke that casts all illegal
drug users as abusers. The fact that a person uses an illegal drug responsibly is not
taken into account under present federal laws. Indeed, whether or not the person
even uses the drug is irrelevant, as the federal law makes it a criminal offense merely
to possess an illegal drug.76
Beginning in the 1990s, the United States Government began to re-engineer its
drug prohibition metaphor, recasting drug users not so much as “the enemy,” but
rather as victims suffering from the “disease” of drug use who desperately need
treatment. In 1997, the disease metaphor was officially consecrated when the
opening paragraph of that year’s National Drug Control Strategy report compared
“drug abuse” to an “insidious cancer,” which “diminishes the potential of our
citizens for full growth and development.”77
“The metaphor of a war on drugs is misleading,” wrote then-Drug Czar General
Barry McCaffrey78 in a section of the report titled “An Enduring Challenge:”
75

See Thomas Nicholson et al., Is Recreational Drug Use Normal?, 7 J. SUBSTANCE USE 18 (2002), http://duncan-associates.com/Is-Recreational-Drug-Use-Normal.pdf (last visited
Apr. 7, 2006); see also Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs,
Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939 (1989), http://www.science.smith.edu/
departments/Biochem/Chm_357/drug_wars.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2006); see also M.E.
Jarvik, The Drug Dilemma: Manipulating the Demand, in 250 SCIENCE 387 (1990); see also
A. Goldstein, & H. Kalant, Drug Policy: Striking the Right Balance, in 249 SCIENCE 1513
(1990); see also C. Winick, Social Behavior, Public Policy, and Nonharmful Drug Use, in 69
(3) MILLBANK Q. 437 (1991).
76

21 U.S.C. § 844 (a) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . .”) (emphasis added).
77
Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1997, The
Purposes and Nature of Strategy, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/htm/chapter1.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006).
78

Six months after his resignation as “Drug Czar,” Barry McCaffrey joined the board of
directors of Drug Abuse Sciences, Inc., “the world’s first pharmaceutical company worldwide
devoted solely to developing medications for the treatment of addiction.” (Press Release.
(2001, July 24). Drug Abuse Sciences, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020212
064926/drugabusesciences.com/Articles.asp?entry=123 (last visited December 4, 2006).
DrugAbuse Sciences, views drug abuse and dependence as “chronic disease of the brain.” (Id.)
Upon announcing McCaffrey as a new board member, Elizabeth M. Greetham, DrugAbuse

2004-05]

NEUROCOPS: THE POLITICS OF PROHIBITION

231

Wars are expected to end. Addressing drug abuse is a continuous
challenge; the moment we believe ourselves to be victorious and free to
relax our resolve, drug abuse will rise again. Furthermore, the United
States does not wage war on its citizens, many of whom are the victims of
drug abuse. These individuals must be helped, not defeated.79
In this same section, General McCaffrey expanded the disease metaphor, writing:
A more appropriate analogy for the drug problem is cancer. Dealing with
cancer is a long-term proposition. It requires the mobilization of support
mechanisms — human, medical, educational, and societal, among others
— to check its spread, deal with its consequences, and improve the
prognosis. Resistance to its spread is necessary, but so is patience,
compassion, and the will to carry on against its inroads. Pain must be
managed while the root cause is attacked. The road to recovery is long
and complex.80
The National Drug Control Strategy focuses government resources to help
Americans make the right decisions — for their individual well-being and
for society — and to reduce the cancer of drugs in America.81
McCaffrey’s analogy to cancer is calculated. Cancer is the ultimate modern-day
illness, the master disease we most fear. Author Susan Sontag who lived a
significant portion of her life fighting breast and uterine cancer, pointed out that:
the use of cancer as a metaphor . . . amounts to saying, first of all, that the
event or situation is unqualifiedly and unredeemably wicked. It
enormously ups the ante . . . To describe a phenomenon as a cancer is an
incitement to violence. The use of cancer in political discourse
encourages fatalism and justifies ‘severe’ measures.82
Although the rhetoric used by McCaffrey suggests an abandonment of the “war”
metaphor (and with it the strategies, tactics, and fervor drawn upon in “wartime”), it
is clear that the cancer metaphor is not so much a replacement for the war metaphor
but rather a new front in that war. Sontag notes that the:
controlling metaphors in descriptions of cancer, are, in fact, drawn
from…the language of warfare. . . . [T]alk of siege and war…has with
cancer, a striking literalness and authority. Not only is the clinical course

Sciences’ CEO said, “We are extremely fortunate to have General McCaffrey as a board
member. He will be of immense assistance to the company in the critical policy and political
arenas surrounding the treatment of addiction in the U.S. Americans understand that a chronic
disease like addiction requires effective medical intervention over a long period of time.” (Id.)
79

Id.

80

Id.
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Id.
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SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 82-83 (1990).

232

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 19:215

of the disease and its medical treatment thus described, but the disease
itself is conceived as the enemy on which society wages war.83
Just as our best scientists have been working for decades to find a “cure for
cancer,” the “cancer of drugs” is now an illness in need of a medical cure. This line
of thinking was made explicit in the 2001 National Drug Control Strategy, which
reported “[j]ust like other chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, and
cancer, for which medications have been developed, drug addiction is a disease that
merits medication for its treatment.”84
Section II of the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy report, titled “Healing
America’s Drug Users,” opens with a historical anecdote about how London’s 1854
cholera plague was stopped when Dr. John Snow realized that the infection was
spreading via contaminated city water. The report views Dr. Snow’s strategy of
“block[ing] the vectors that spread contagion,” as a way to “help us fight a modern
epidemic—the spread of drug use and addiction.”85
Perhaps of most concern is the fact that the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy
report drops even the pretense of distinguishing drug abuse from drug use. In fact,
the 2003 report expressly targets “drug users” as the primary “vectors of contagion,”
asserting:
[Drug use] spreads because the vectors of contagion are not addicts in the
streets but users who do not yet show the consequences of their drug
habit. Last year, some 16 million Americans used an illegal drug on at
least a monthly basis, while 6.1 million Americans were in need of
treatment. The rest, still in the “honeymoon” phase of their drug-using
careers, are “carriers” who transmit the disease to others who see only the
surface of the fraud. Treatment practitioners report that new users in
particular are prone to encouraging their peers to join them in their new
behavior.86
The way a problem is conceptualized or defined often dictates what measures
will be employed to solve it.87 The fact that the government characterizes illegal
83

Id. at 64-66.

84

Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy: 2001, Ch.
3, § 2, Medications for Drug Addiction, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/
publications/policy/ndcs01/chap3_2.html#9 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
85

Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, Healing
America’s Drug Users: Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are Needed, Budget
Highlights, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs03/iiheal_amer_us
r.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
86

Id.
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Thirty years ago, Dr. Andrew Weil noted:

Until the models that produce the current laws, decisions, and actions about drugs
change, nothing about drugs will change, hence the uselessness of pressing for legal
reforms as a means of solving the drug problem. Counter productive laws against
possession and sale of drugs are not causes of problems; they are symptoms of
problems at the level of conceptions, of mental images, just as physical symptoms of
illness are effects of mental states.
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drug users as “carriers” and “vectors of contagion,” and that some of the new
pharmacotherapy drugs have been given the moniker “vaccines,” would dovetail
with a future move to make the use of pharmacotherapy drugs compulsory, at least
for some segments of the population. Already “National Priority 1” of the 2003
National Drug Control Strategy is titled “Stopping Use Before It Starts: Education
and Community Action.”88 Although the 2003 report focuses on in-school lessons
which teach students how illegal drug use is bad for a student’s health, the federal
government’s focus on students has already gone far beyond “drug education.”
Today, public school authorities are empowered to conduct random urine testing of
students who wish to participate in any extracurricular activities, including the chess
club.89 The new wave of pharmacotherapy drugs promises the ultimate tool for
“Stopping Use Before It Starts.” Indeed, the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy
report coined the new term “compassionate coercion,” noting:
The overwhelming majority of users characterized with dependence or
abuse do not see themselves as actually needing drug treatment. This
tendency is particularly pronounced among adolescents and young adults.
Of the estimated 3.9 million individuals who needed but did not receive
treatment in 2000, fewer than 10 percent—just 381,000—reported
actually thinking that they needed help. . . . But the obvious conclusion
one would draw from the data is in fact the correct one: most people who
need drug treatment do not think they have a problem. To borrow a
popular phrase, they are in denial. If there were ever any question about
the role of coercion in getting people into treatment, these findings should
answer it.
Most drug users—the lucky ones, at least—are no strangers to coercion.
People in need of drug treatment are fortunate if they run up against the
compassionate coercion of family, friends, employers, the criminal justice
system, and others. Such pressure needs no excuse; the health and safety
of the addicted individual, as well as that of the community, require it.90
The 2003 National Drug Control Strategy report adds that in addition to
confrontations by family members and law enforcement officers, drug users may
well require “the use of innovative techniques for fighting addiction, such as
specialized pharmaceuticals.”91
ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND: A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO THE DRUG PROBLEM 1,
193 (1st ed. 1972).
88

Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, Stopping
Using Before It Starts: Education and Community Action, http://www.whitehouse
drugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs03/istop_use.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
89

See, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

90
Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2002 National Drug Control Strategy,
National Priorities II: Healing America’s Drug Users, available at http://www.whitehousedrug
policy.gov/publications/policy/03ndcs/2priorities.html (last visited May 7, 2003) (bold
emphasis added; italics original).
91

“Healing America’s Drug Users: Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are
Needed,” In the National Drug Control Strategy: 2003. op.cit.
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IV. NEUROCOPS: LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY COMPULSORY PHARMACOTHERAPY
The compelled use of pharmacotherapy, whether “compassionate” or otherwise,
would raise a number of legal issues. Given that the United States Government has
adopted a policy framed by a metaphor that combines fighting war and illness, and
which expressly analogizes the use of illegal drugs to cancer, the potential for
infringing on constitutional guarantees and other legal rights is apparent. It is well
known and widely accepted that treating cancer often requires drastic measures that
knowingly compromise the health of other body systems. When treating cancer,
notes Susan Sontag, “[i]t is impossible to avoid damaging or destroying healthy cells
(indeed, some methods used to treat cancer can cause cancer), but it is thought that
nearly any damage to the body is justified if it saves the patient’s life.”92 Inasmuch
as substantial damage has already been done to the United States Constitution in
order to fight the war on drugs,93 signs foreshadow a continued erosion of individual
freedoms justified as an unavoidable side-effect of waging war on the “cancer” of
illegal drug use.
Among the rights implicated by compulsory use of pharmacotherapy drugs are
the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom of thought, as well as the right to
provide informed consent before receiving medical treatment. For prisoners, the
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment is also
implicated.
A. Privacy and Liberty Interests Implicated by Involuntary Pharamacotherapy
In one of his earliest legal opinions, and while still serving as a state court judge,
Justice Cardozo, sounded a chord that has echoed through many subsequent cases,
writing in 1914 that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body.”94 The Supreme Court has
routinely recognized that a fundamental aspect of privacy is the “freedom to care for
one’s health and person, [free] from bodily restraint or compulsion.”95 This principle
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1990, when in the Cruzan case,
the Majority noted, “[t]he principle that a competent adult has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions.”96 Unfortunately, the precise nature and root of this liberty
interest remains vague. Professor Winick, for example, notes that “[a]lthough the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions . . . recognize that involuntary medication may
implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest, they do not explore the nature
of that interest and leave unresolved many of the substantive and procedural
92

SONTAG, supra note 82, at 65.

93

See A Report of The Special Committee on Drugs and the Law of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York A Wiser Course: Ending Drug Prohibition (June 14, 1994),
http://www.drugtext.org/library/reports/nylawyer/nylawyer.htm (“One of the more insidious
effects of the ‘war on drugs’ has been the gradual erosion of the rule of law and the public’s
civil liberties.”).
94

Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled in part
by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
95

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

96

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
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constitutional questions raised by involuntary treatment.”97 The right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment appears to be derived from the common law tort of
battery, combined with liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to bodily integrity, the right of privacy,
and a general principle of individual autonomy.98 In practice, these interests have
been protected by the legal requirements of informed consent.
Yet, compelling a person to use a pharmacotherapy drug seems to implicate more
than the bodily integrity rights noted above. Also at stake is the right to “freedom of
thought.” While the phrase “freedom of thought” is not explicitly used in the United
States Constitution, it has long been recognized as a fundamental right of equal
stature to the express constitutional guarantees. As Supreme Court Justice Benjamin
Cardozo observed, “freedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations, a pervasive
recognition of that truth can be traced in our history—political and legal.”99
Unfortunately, the right to freedom of thought is woefully underdeveloped given
the capabilities of modern psychopharmacology and continuing advances in the
neurosciences. Whatever may be at the roots of human consciousness, there is no
debate that what, and how, a person thinks is deeply intertwined with his or her
functional neurochemistry.100 Because pharmacotherapy drugs target brain function,
97

BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT
1997).

TO

REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, 15 (1st ed.

98
See F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.3 LEGAL THEORIES
CONSENT; see also WINICK, supra note 97, at 189, 222 (concluding that the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication, psychosurgery, and electronic stimulation for the
brain implicate a liberty interest protected by due process,” and are “so serious and longlasting that the liberty interest invaded by these treatments should be considered fundamental,”
requiring heightened judicial scrutiny when sought to be imposed coercively).

OF

99
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
100

Altering a person’s brain chemistry for the purpose of altering how that person thinks is
the basis of a pharmaceutical sector with approximately $20 billion in global sales. The sale
of Prozac® and similar “antidepressant” drugs is currently one of the most profitable segments
of the pharmaceutical drug industry. According to IMS Health, a fifty-year-old company
specializing in pharmaceutical market intelligence and analyses, “[a]ntidepressants were the
world’s third-largest therapy class in 2000[.]” IMS Health, Expanding and Protecting an
Antidepressant’s Sales, available at http://www.ims-global.com/insight/news_story/0107/
news_story_010726a.htm. Global pharmazceutical sales of antidepressants and mood
stabilizers was 19.8 billion in 2005. The same year, Glogal antipsychotic drug sales reached
16.2 billion. Ims Health, Leading Therapy Classes by Global Pharmaceutical Sales,
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_77478579_77479683,00.
html. A report published by the Lewin Group in January 2000, found that within the Medicaid
program alone, “Antidepressant prescriptions totaled 19 million in 1998 . . . [and]
[a]ntipsychotic prescriptions totaled eleven million in 1998.” CATHERINE HARRINGTON ET AL.,
THE LEWIN GROUP, ACCESS AND UTILIZATION OF NEW ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC
MEDICATIONS (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/search/health/reports/Psychmedaccess/
index.htm#TOC (last visited Aug. 20, 2000). I should underscore that, in my opinion, the
development of such drugs is to be applauded for their potential to aid millions of suffering
people who voluntarily use them.
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often blocking entire classes of receptors, they will undoubtedly have some effects
on how a person thinks. The pharmacotherapy drug SR141716, for example,
indiscriminately blocks the brain’s CB1 receptors. As a result, even the brain’s
natural endocannabinoids are blocked from entering their home receptors. These
endocannabinoids are believed to play a major role in how we feel stress and pain,
how we sleep, how we modulate food intake, and even how well we remember.101
For the right to freedom of thought to mean anything, it can no longer exist in a
Cartesian quarantine, blind to the connection between our thoughts and our brains.
To avoid eroding freedom of thought from below, it must be found to inherently
protect the integrity of a person’s underlying functional neurochemistry.102 Coercive
pharmacotherapy would substantially violate that integrity and thus should be seen as
infringing the right to freedom of thought.
B. Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent was first articulated in the Nuremburg Code,
the first sentence of which states: “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.”103 Today, all fifty states have laws that protect informed
consent. These laws require that before performing medical experiments, procedures,
or treatments, medical personnel must make certain disclosures to patients and obtain
the patient’s consent.104

101
Mark Greener, Pharmacy Update: A Gift From the Gods?, in CHEMIST & DRUGGIST
MODULE 1328 (Feb. 19, 2005), http://www.dotpharmacy.co.uk/up1328.pdf (last visited June
27, 2005).
102

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics in Support of the
Petition for Certiorari, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available at
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-5664/02-5664.ami.pet.ccle.pdf
(last visited June 27, 2005) (arguing the merits of cognitive liberty and security and
elaborating the concepts of “cognitive liberty” and “cognitive security” as necessary
components of the right to freedom of thought is the project of a longer article by the author
currently in progress).
103
See Jay Katz et al., Experimentation with Human Beings: The Authority of the
Investigator, Subject, Professions, and State in Human Experimentation Process, 305-306
(1972) (containing full text of the Nuremberg Code).
104
JONATHAN P. TOMES, LAWS INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONAL, 69-102 (1993). California, for example, has an informed consent provision in
its Penal Code, which in pertinent part states:

It is hereby recognized and declared that all persons, including all persons
involuntarily confined, have a fundamental right against enforced interference with
their thought processes, states of mind, and patterns of mentation through the use of
organic therapies; that this fundamental right requires that no person with the capacity
for informed consent who refuses organic therapy shall be compelled to undergo such
therapy . . . .CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670 (2005).
Another provision, however, appears to specifically exempt Antabuse, and similar metabolism
modifiers from the informed consent requirements, stating “[n]othing in this article shall be
construed to prevent the administration of drugs not connected with a program of conditioning
and intended to cause negative physical reactions to ingestion of alcohol or drugs.” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2670.5(3)(f) (2005).
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In general, informed consent requires the satisfaction of two conditions. First,
trained medical personnel must tell the patient what alternative treatments exist, the
benefits and dangers associated with the proposed treatment, and the disadvantages
of forgoing treatment. Second, once the person has received all the relevant medical
information, he or she must freely and voluntarily decide whether or not to undergo
the treatment.105 Coercion is clearly anathema to informed consent: [i]nformed
consent means the knowing consent of an individual or his legally authorized
representative so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without
undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of
constraint or coercion.”106
Coercion, whether “compassionate” or otherwise, is still coercion. Indeed,
“compassionate coercion” can be more insidious. As Justice Brandeis warned
decades ago: “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government’s purposes are beneficent . . . . The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without
understanding.”107
Although it is a criminal offense to use or possess drugs such as marijuana,
opium, and cocaine for nonmedical purposes,108 a person who desires medical
treatment for his or her drug use does not forfeit the right to decide whether to utilize

105
The American Medical Association’s (AMA) “General Statement on Informed
Consent,” Code of Medical Ethics, states:

The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The patient should
make his or her own determination on treatment. The physician’s obligation is to
present the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible for
the patient’s care and to make recommendations for management in accordance with
good medical practice. The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient
make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical
practice. Informed consent is a basic social policy for which exceptions are permitted:
(1) where the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm
from failure to treat is imminent; or (2) when risk disclosure poses such a serious
psychological threat of detriment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated.
Social policy does not accept the paternalistic view that the physician may remain
silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy.
Rational, informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly, even under
similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing treatment.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.08 (1981), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8488.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
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45 FR 78600.
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Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

108

Depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction, it is sometimes legal to use these
drugs for medical purposes. Eight states currently allow sick people to use marijuana for
medical purposes, although the federal government is hostile and has indeed prosecuted
medical users and caregivers in states with medical marijuana protections. Opium and cocaine
are both Schedule II substances, which under federal law can be used with a doctor’s
prescription.
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drug-based medical treatment. There is no “drug war exception” to informed
consent requirements.
The only exceptions to requirements for informed consent, besides emergencies,
concern persons who have been declared mentally incompetent, or who are too
young to make their own medical decisions. What, exactly, is meant by “mentally
incompetent” remains vague. “Although the competency question is…of critical
importance,” notes Professor Winick in his comprehensive examination of the right
to refuse mental treatment, “no general agreement exists concerning the appropriate
legal standard for ascertaining competency to provide informed consent.”109 While
“Substance Dependence” and “Substance Abuse” are diagnostic categories within
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), a diagnosis
pursuant to the DSM-IV is insufficient for a de facto legal finding of mental
incompetence.110 The DSM-IV itself instructs “[I]n most situations, the clinical
diagnosis of a DSM-IV disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal
purposes or a ‘mental disorder, ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental
defect.’ In determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g.,
for competence…), additional information is usually required beyond that contained
in the DSM-IV diagnosis.”111 No court has gone so far as to equate the mere use or
abuse of illegal drugs with mental incompetence. In only rare circumstances will a
person’s use, or even addiction to, an illegal drug render that person “mentally
incompetent” such that he or she should be exempted from informed consent
requirements.
Accordingly, for the vast majority of people, including those who use illegal
drugs, the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom of thought, along with the
right of informed consent should stand as a strong and broad barrier to coercive
pharmacotherapy.
C. At Risk Targets for Coercive Pharmacotherapy
In practical terms, however, some people are more at risk of coercive
pharmacotherapy than others. From 1907 to 1978, over 60,000 Americans were
forcibly sterilized under state sterilization laws.112 These laws targeted criminals, the
mentally handicapped, people with low IQs, and those suffering from mental illness.
The enforcement of state and federal drug prohibition laws has been
disproportionately focused on the poor and on people of color. As speakers at a
2002 civil rights conference lamented, “[o]ur criminal laws, while facially neutral,
are enforced in a manner that is massively and pervasively biased. The injustices of
the criminal justice system threaten to render irrelevant fifty years of hard-fought

109

WINICK, supra note 97, at 349.

110

In addition to the general dependence and abuse diagnosis defined by the DSM-IV,
there is also a range of more specific diagnosis based on the particular substance (e.g., alcohol,
cannabis, cocaine, etc.) involved. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
111
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Id. at xxiii.
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civil rights progress.”113 Nowhere is this truer than in the drug war. As noted by
Human Rights Watch:
The racially disproportionate nature of the war on drugs is not just
devastating to black Americans. It contradicts faith in the principles of
justice and equal protection of the laws that should be the bedrock of any
constitutional democracy; it exposes and deepens the racial fault lines that
continue to weaken the country and belies its promise as a land of equal
opportunity; and it undermines faith among all races in the fairness and
efficacy of the criminal justice system. Urgent action is needed, at both
the state and federal level, to address this crisis for the American nation.114
People who have been arrested for drug offenses, who are serving time in prison,
or who rely on public assistance or other public benefits (including the country’s 59
million public school children)115 are likely the most vulnerable targets for coercive
pharmacotherapy.
1. Pharmacotherapy and Public Education
Each year roughly ninety-seven percent of American school children are
vaccinated against childhood diseases as a precondition to attending school.116
Almost 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that there was nothing
in the Constitution or elsewhere to prevent a state from mandating compulsory
vaccination,117 and today nearly every state has laws requiring children to be
vaccinated prior to entering the public school system. Parents who refuse to have
their children vaccinated have been charged with neglect and even child abuse.118
Many parents would undoubtedly rise in protest to any effort to include
pharmacotherapy “vaccines” in the childhood vaccine program because drug use is
not an infectious disease. Government rhetoric, however, is already laying the
groundwork for responding to such parental objections. According to the 2001
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Ronald H. Welch & Carlos T. Angulo, Justice On Trial: Racial Disparities in the
American Criminal Justice System (Washington, DC: Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights/Leadership Conference Education Fund, May 2000), p. v.
114
Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on
Drugs, Key Recommendations, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/drugs/war/ key-reco.htm.
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United States Census Bureau, School Enrollment – Social and Economic Characteristics
of Students: October 2003 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 2005pubs/p20554.pdf (last visited June 27, 2005).
116
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children
Enrolled in Head Start Programs and Licensed Child Care Centers and Entering School —
United States and Selected Reporting Areas, 1999—2000 School Year, 50(39) MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 846, 849 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5039.
pdf (last visited June 27, 2005).
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See In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (petition alleging
that “the subject child Christine . . . is a neglected child within the meaning of Family Court
Act . . . in that ‘the respondent [parent] . . . refuses to have Christine immunized in accordance
with the recommendations of a physician’”).
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National Drug Control Strategy, drug addiction, like infectious and biological
diseases that can weaken a person’s immune system or bodily integrity, can also
provide a fertile ground for other diseases to attack and “place people at increased
risk for a wide variety of other illnesses.”119 For example, elaborating on how drug
abuse breeds infectious disease, former “Drug Czar” General McCaffrey writes:
Drug abuse, whether directly or indirectly, is now a major vector for the
transmission of infectious diseases, including acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis. Increasing
numbers of such cases are being reported among the partners of
intravenous drug users. Most HIV-infected newborns have mothers who
acquired this disease through their own drug use or sexual activity with a
drug user.120
American schoolchildren are already subject to reduced constitutional
protections, especially when illegal drugs are concerned. In 2002, the United States
Supreme Court upheld drug testing of public school students wishing to participate
in extracurricular activities on the ground that a public school has an “important
interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students.”121
In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
[t]he need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use
provides the necessary immediacy for a school testing policy. Indeed, it
would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial
portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to
institute a drug-testing program designed to deter drug use.
Given the nationwide epidemic of drug use and the evidence of increased
drug use in Tecumseh schools, it was entirely reasonable for the School
District to enact this particular drug testing policy.122
In the same opinion the Court remarked, “[s]choolchildren are routinely required
to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease. . . Securing
order in the school environment sometimes requires that students be subjected to
greater controls than those appropriate for adults.”123
On December 1, 2003, NIDA published an official notice seeking grant
applications focusing on “the identification, evaluation, and development of safe and
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The Office of National Drug Control Policy, supra note 77, at Introductory Pgph.
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Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2001 National Drug Control Strategy, Ch.
1, § 4, The Public-Health Dimension of Substance Abuse, http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/
publications/policy/ndcs01/chap1.html#4 (last visited June 27, 2005).
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Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2005)
(“A student who has been convicted of any offense under any Federal or State law involving
the possession or sale of a controlled substance shall not be eligible to receive any grant, loan,
or work assistance . . . during the period beginning on the date of such conviction and ending
after the interval specified . . .”).
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effective pharmacological treatments for cannabis-related disorders (CRDs).” A
section of this notice, titled “Targeting Children,” explained:
Given the extent of the use of cannabis in the general population and the
medical and psychological consequences of its use, particularly the
clinically significant psychosocial impairment, there is a great public
health need to develop safe and effective therapeutic interventions. The
need to develop treatments targeting adolescents and young adults is
particularly relevant in view of their disproportionate use patterns.124
On such a landscape, there is at least a reasonable possibility that government
rhetoric equating the use of illegal drugs with infectious disease, combined with the
already watered-down constitutional rights of children who attend public school,
may set the stage for efforts to require children to accept various pharmacotherapy
“vaccines” as a precondition to attending public school or to participating in sports
and other extracurricular activities.
Indeed, in July 2004, the British newspaper The Independent reported:
A radical scheme to vaccinate children against future drug addiction is
being considered by ministers . . . Under the plans, doctors would
immunize children at risk of becoming smokers or drug users with an
injection. The scheme could operate in a similar way to the current
nationwide measles, mumps and rubella vaccination program.125
Such plans, should they ever be implemented, would clearly violate the right to
informed consent if not entirely voluntary. Despite government rhetoric equating
drug use with infectious disease and pharmacotherapy drugs with “vaccinations,” the
analogies fail. Drug use bears no relationship to infectious diseases like measles,
mumps, or rubella, and pharmacotherapy is not a “vaccine.” Further, while the cases
that have upheld drug testing of public school children have been premised on the
“important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students,”126 and
on the interest of “prevent[ing] and deter[ing] the substantial harm of childhood drug
use,”127 interests that could just as easily be offered in support of pharmacotherapy, a
major distinction exists between drug testing and coercive pharmacotherapy.
Currently, drug testing is performed on fluids or hair removed from the child’s body
in a relatively noninvasive manner. While government examination of a child’s
bodily fluids or hair raises significant privacy issues (issues which the courts have
placed secondary to the state’s interest in deterring and preventing illegal drug use by
school children), those privacy issues pale in comparison to the very direct affront to
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National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug Abuse, RFD-DA-04-014,
Medications Development for Cannabis-Related Disorder (2003), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
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bodily integrity and privacy that would be raised by government requiring a student
to take a particular pharmacotherapy drug into his or her body and brain.128
2. Pharmacotherapy and Public Assistance
Future recipients of public assistance might conceivably be threatened with
compulsory pharmacotherapy as a condition to receiving benefits. Although studies
indicate that welfare recipients do not use or abuse illegal drugs in any greater
percentage than working people,129 the stereotype of “drug-using welfare recipients”
is widespread and has resulted in increased government control and even denial of
certain benefits.
Users of illegal drugs, for example, are excluded from the Fair Housing Act.
Public housing can be denied to any person who has been convicted of a felony drug
offense or who is known to currently use illegal drugs, even if they are in a drug
treatment program.130
Federal law imposes a lifetime bar on any individual convicted of a drug felony
from receiving food stamps.131 People convicted of drug felonies are also barred
from voting in many states. The Washington Post reported in 1997 that 1.46 million
black men out of a total voting population of 10.4 million have lost their right to vote
due to felony convictions.132
In 1996, Congress ended the federal welfare system as an entitlement program.
Under the new Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, cash assistance for individuals is now limited and can be conditioned on
meeting job-seeking requirements and adhering to “personal responsibility codes.”133
One provision of the new Act authorizes states to impose mandatory drug testing as a
prerequisite to receiving state assistance.134 As a result, Louisiana passed a law in
128

While the precise roots and scope of the “liberty” interest remain unarticulated, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a
nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
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dependent on alcohol or drugs [is] relatively small and consistent with the general US
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(1996).
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42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(s), 1437d(t) (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2005)
(codifying “one-strike” eviction policies that allow public housing agencies to immediately
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also Dep’t of Hous. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (upholding a local Public Housing
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1997 requiring drug testing for welfare recipients and certain public employees. (A
task force subsequently decided to limit testing to only those applicants who
indicated on a questionnaire that they use illegal drugs). In 1998, Florida
implemented a similar system. New Jersey, Minnesota, South Carolina and
Wisconsin also randomly drug test welfare recipients with felony drug convictions.135
In early 2005, the 109th Congress debated a bill to deny federal welfare funding
to any state that does not drug test those applying for or receiving welfare benefits.136
In 1999, Michigan legislators passed a similar law conditioning public assistance on
passing a random drug test.137 The law was struck down by a federal court which
ruled that the law’s suspicionless drug testing provisions were an unconstitutional
infringement on aid recipients’ Fourth Amendment rights.138
Three basic versions of legislation that might endeavor to connect public aid to
pharmacotherapy can be anticipated. In order of increasing concern, these laws are:
1) offering to reimburse public benefit recipients for the cost of undergoing
pharmacotherapy; 2) offering a financial incentive (e.g., a “bonus” payment), for
agreeing to undergo pharmacotherapy; 3) requiring pharmacotherapy as a
precondition to receiving public aid.
a. Reimbursing Voluntary Pharmacotherapy
Programs reimbursing public assistance recipients for the expense of voluntary
pharmacotherapy appear to raise few legal concerns. All fifty states, for example,
currently have programs reimbursing indigent people for the cost of surgery to
implant the long-acting contraceptive device Norplant®.139
Studies have shown that it is good public policy to provide free drug treatment
for those who seek treatment but cannot afford it.140 If informed and voluntary use of

135

Robyn Meredith, Testing Welfare Applicant for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), May 30,
1999, at A14, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v99/n575/a04.html?1690 (last visited June 29,
2005).
136

See The Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005, H.R. 240,
109th Cong., available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_
cong_bills& docid=f:h240ih.txt.pdf (last visited June 29, 2005).
137

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.57l (2005).

138

Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Mich. 2000), aff’d en banc, 60 Fed.
Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
139

‘Norplant’ is a registered trademark of the Population Council. It is a long-acting
implantable contraceptive device for women, approved by the FDA for general use on
December 10, 1990. Consisting of six match-sized plastic capsules containing the synthetic
hormone levonorgestrel, the Norplant capsules are surgically implanted in a woman’s upper
arm. Once implanted, the device releases levonorgestrel for as long as five years. During this
period, the implanted woman is effectively sterile. See Drugs.com, Norplant Information
Page, http://www.drugs.com/MTM/N/Norplant_System.html; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, In
the Context of Welfare and Reproductive Rights: The Only Good Poor Woman:
Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 931 (1995).
140

See C. PETER RYDELL & SUSAN S. EVERINGHAM, CONTROLLING COCAINE: SUPPLY
VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS xvi (1994), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/
MR/MR331/ (last visited June 29, 2005) (“Domestic enforcement costs 4 times as much as
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pharmacotherapy will aid in the treatment process, no reason exists to exclude it
from reimbursement. Public funds for voluntary pharmacotherapy ought to be
available to subsidize that treatment, especially when the government is
enthusiastically willing to spend thousands of dollars to arrest and imprison that
same person for using a controlled substance.
Unfortunately, federal funds are predominantly allocated to policing and
enforcing criminal drug prohibition, rather than to funding treatment on demand. In
2002, for example, less than twenty percent of the federal drug control policy budget
was allocated to funding treatment programs.141
Nothing is coercive about reimbursing an indigent person for the costs of medical
treatment. More worrisome is that people living in poverty typically have reduced
access to professional medical advice concerning elective procedures. As a result,
they may find it difficult to obtain general information about the potential health
risks associated with a particular pharmacotherapy drug, as well as specific
information regarding their own health concerns vis-à-vis such a drug. Indeed, some
of the pharmacotherapy drugs are so new that data concerning their long-term side
effects has yet to be collected or analyzed. Without sufficient access to medical
information and advice, consent to undergo pharmacotherapy, while perhaps
voluntary, would not be informed, and hence would not satisfy the requirements of
informed consent.
b. Financial Incentive to Undergo Pharmacotherapy
Another foreseeable form of future legislation might offer a financial incentive or
“bonus” for agreeing to undergo pharmacotherapy. In this scenario, the pubic aid
recipient would receive the standard aid payment regardless of whether he or she
underwent pharmacotherapy, but would also receive an additional bonus payment if
he or she agreed to undergo pharmacotherapy.
Less than a year after the Norplant contraception device was approved, a Kansas
legislator introduced a bill that would have paid welfare mothers $500 if they would
consent to using Norplant, and an additional $50 for each year that they remained on
the contraceptive.142 After the bill failed, its author proposed a second bill that would
have made the insertion of Norplant a condition of probation for women convicted of
certain drug possession offenses.143 That bill also did not pass. Representative David
Duke of Louisiana (an admitted former leader in the Ku Klux Klan who ran for
President of the United States in 1992) unsuccessfully introduced a similar bill in
1991, which would have paid welfare mothers $100 per month if they agreed to

treatment for a given amount of user reduction, 7 times as much for consumption reduction,
and 15 times as much for societal cost reduction.”).
141

Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2003 National Drug Control Strategy:
Budget Highlights, Budget Summary 6, Table 2 (2002).
142
143

H.R. 2089, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (Kan. 1991) (defeated).

H.R. 2255, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (Kan. 1991) (died in committee); see Stephanie
Denmark, Birth-Control Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, October 19, 1991, at A23; see also Kerry
Patrick, Poor Women and Society Benefit by Linking Norplant, Welfare Aid, WICHITA EAGLE,
(Wichita, Kansas) March 4, 1991, at 11A.
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Norplant.144 All told, at least thirteen states have considered bills that would link
state welfare payments to the use of Norplant.145
Legislation proposing “bonus” payments for low-income people who agree to
undergo pharmacotherapy would likely meet the same unsuccessful political end as
efforts to provide bonuses for using Norplant. Assuming, however, that such
legislation was successfully enacted in the future, it would raise difficult informed
consent issues.
In order to obtain the added financial “bonus” some low-income people, even
those who do not use or desire to use illegal drugs, might be tempted to undergo
pharmacotherapy. The desire to rise above poverty is a powerful drive, and could
lead some people to undergo pharmacotherapy even if it was contraindicated or
potentially risky given other pre-existing health concerns. Courts would have to
decide whether such economic “coercion” is sufficient to vitiate “voluntary” consent.
Being poor in a capitalist system is to be inherently disempowered within that
system, causing economic decisions to take on what some might argue are shades of
coercion. Even if this is not legally sufficient to constitute coercion, it raises the
moral issue of whether government ought to intentionally exploit such economic
disadvantages. Further, as discussed in the preceding section, low-income people
have reduced access to medical information concerning the purposes, risks, and
effects of pharmacotherapy, raising questions that the person’s consent to undergo
pharmacotherapy in order to receive a “bonus” payment might be based on
insufficient information to satisfy the requirements of informed consent.
c. Conditioning Public Benefits on Pharmacotherapy
The most inherently coercive type of foreseeable legislation linking
pharmacotherapy with public aid would be the direct conditioning of public
assistance on the use of a pharmacotherapy drug. Under this potential legislative
scheme, only those who agree to undergo pharmacotherapy would be eligible for
public aid.
Though none of the bills have passed, legislators in several states have sought to
condition public assistance on the use of Norplant. A bill proposed in Mississippi
sought to mandate the use of Norplant for female welfare recipients, requiring
“women with four or more children to be implanted with Norplant in order to qualify
for or continue to be eligible for public assistance.”146 A similar bill was introduced
but failed to pass in Florida.
While less coercive than being physically forced to undergo pharmacotherapy, a
parent who is dependant upon receiving government assistance in order to pay rent
or buy food for his or her children would undoubtedly feel powerless to refuse
pharmacotherapy if it meant forfeiting necessary financial assistance. Such a scheme
144
H.R. 1584, 17th Reg. Sess. (La. 1991); Maralee Schwartz, Duke Presses Louisiana
Birth Control, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 29, 1992, at A14.
145
See Gwendolyn Mink, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: Welfare Reform in
Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879 (1994).
146

S. 2895, (Miss. 1992) (defeated); See David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 195 (1992); see also ALAN
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, NORPLANT: OPPORTUNITIES AND PERILS FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN
(SPEC. REP. 1) (Dec. 1992).
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would be overtly and intentionally premised on economic coercion and would thus
weigh heavily against a finding that “consent” to undergo pharmacotherapy was truly
voluntary. Combined with very limited and sometimes non-existent access to
professional medical advice, such a legislative scheme would prey upon the poor and
encourage the antithesis of informed consent.
In addition, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
government must satisfy the strict scrutiny test in order to allocate public benefits by
conditioning that allocation on the waiver of a fundamental right. Thus, if directly
imposing pharmacotherapy on a person is found to substantially infringe on the
combined rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought, conditioning
public assistance on waiving those rights would be unconstitutional unless the
government can show that the pharmacotherapy condition serves a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.147 This is known as the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.
Assuming the government’s interest is to reduce or deter the use of illegal drugs
by those on public assistance, forced pharmacotherapy is a grossly overbroad means
of advancing that interest. As already noted, most people who receive public
assistance do not use illegal drugs, and never will. Accordingly, demanding that
they all undergo pharmacotherapy in order to receive public assistance would be the
antithesis of a “narrowly tailored” means of advancing the government’s interest in
enforcing drug prohibition. Even for those aid recipients who are found to use illegal
drugs, coercing them to take pharmacotherapy drugs as a precondition to receiving
aid is overbroad. The vast majority of drug treatment programs, both in-patient and
out-patient, operate with only talk therapy, counseling, encouragement, and
monitoring. Therefore, imposing pharmacotherapy even on those aid recipients who
are found to use illegal drugs is, not the least restrictive means of reducing or
deterring their use of drugs.
3. Pharmacotherapy and the Criminal Justice System
Today, of the two million prisoners in the United States (roughly one in every
140 U.S. residents) approximately one quarter are serving time for drug
convictions.148 The United States Supreme Court has held that “convicted prisoners
do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison.”149 The unique security issues in prison, however, have also
led the Court to recognize that the same standard directed to the alleged
constitutional violations of nonprisoners does not apply to prisoners. “When a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”150 This reduced standard,
combined with the fact that “rehabilitation” is one of the traditional purposes of the
147

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see Charles R. Bogle, Unconscionable
Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 193 (1994).
148

Page M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, PhD, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2002,
Tables 15 & 18, BJS Bull. No. NCJ 200248 (July 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/p02.pdf.
149

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).

150

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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criminal justice system, invites the conclusion that pharmacotherapy medicines,
which are characterized as “treating” drug addiction, could potentially find their way
into prisoners’ blood streams without their consent.
As discussed earlier, the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy report coined the
term “compassionate coercion” and promoted it as a key element for success in the
battle against users of illegal drugs. The White House press release announcing the
report explained that in addition to pressure from family, friends, employers, and the
community, “[c]ompassionate coercion also uses the criminal justice system to get
people into treatment.”151
In the near future, a person sentenced to prison for a drug offense might
conceivably be forced to take a pharmacotherapy drug as part of his or her
“rehabilitation.” Further, given that illegal drugs can reportedly be found in just
about every prison in America and because prisoners are politically weak and
generally regarded unsympathetically by the general populace, one can even imagine
prison officials moving to mandate pharmacotherapy drugs for all inmates as a
means of maintaining prison security and safety.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “central to all other
corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the
corrections facilities themselves.”152 Further, because judges are removed from the
day-to-day challenges and realities that commonly face prison officials and because
operation of correctional facilities is “the province of the Legislative and Executive
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial,” prison administrators are accorded
“wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”153
Prison officials might argue rationally that mandatory pharmacotherapy for all
prisoners is a means of increasing the safety of both prisoners and prison workers.
Pharmacotherapy within prisons would presumably alter the ratio of benefit to risk
for those prisoners able to obtain an illegal drug inside prison. Some prisoners
forced to take pharmacotherapy would presumably find that the benefits of using an
illegal drug with attenuated effects is outweighed by the risk of being caught with an
illegal drug and having his or her sentence increased. This might lead to a reduced
demand for drugs within prison and to a corresponding reduction in supply.

151
Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, The President’s
National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020212-2.html.
152

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1978).

153

Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
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a. Informed Consent
i. Prisoners
Unless a court has determined that a prisoner is mentally incompetent, the
informed consent requirements discussed earlier retain their validity within the
prison context.154
While no court, let alone the United States Supreme Court, has ruled on the
circumstances in which a prisoner can be forced to undergo pharmacotherapy for
illegal drug use, the Supreme Court has placed strict limits on when prison officials
can force a prisoner to take psychiatric medication.155
A prisoner can be compelled to take psychiatric medication in only two
circumstances. First, if he suffers from a serious mental illness and that illness
renders him mentally incompetent to make his own medical decisions, then prison
medical authorities are permitted to forcibly treat the prisoner, so long as the
treatment is in the best interests of the prisoner and complies with due process.156
Second, a prisoner whose mental illness leads him or her to engage in dangerous
behavior that threatens to harm other prisoners or prison staff may be forcibly treated
with psychiatric medication.157
As discussed earlier, no court has ever found that the use of illegal drugs alone
constitutes “mental incompetence.” Indeed, no court has found that physical
addiction to a drug, by itself, constitutes “mental incompetence.” Thus, forced
treatment with pharmacotherapy merely because a prisoner used or is addicted to, an
illegal drug would not satisfy the existing tests for when prisoners can be forced to
undergo psychiatric treatment. Likewise, even if a psychiatrist found that a

154
Under Maryland law, a prisoner who is found to be addicted to drugs may be placed on
a supervised methadone treatment plan, but treatment cannot begin without the prisoner’s
written informed consent. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-603 (2004).
155
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (“A criminal conviction and sentence of
imprisonment extinguish an individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his
sentence, but they do not authorize the State to . . . subject him to involuntary psychiatric
treatment without affording him additional due process protections.”); Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left
free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful
medical treatment . . . as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal
security.”); Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (performing a
hemorrhoidectomy without the prisoner’s consent implicated the prisoner’s right to refuse
medical treatment); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (‘“The forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference with
that person’s liberty.’ In the case of antipsychotic drugs . . . that interference is particularly
severe . . .”) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
156

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003) (“Every State provides avenues
through which, for example, a doctor or institution can seek appointment of a guardian with
the power to make a decision authorizing medication — when in the best interests of a patient
who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.”).
157
Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). Federal regulations set forth specific
procedures that must be followed before prisoners can be forced against their will to take a
psychotropic medicine. See 28 C.F.R. 549.43.
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prisoner’s illegal drug use or addiction constituted a “substance abuse disorder”
within the DSM-IV, this finding alone does not constitute mental incompetence.158
Therefore, forcing a prisoner to undergo pharmacotherapy would not be justified
unless that prisoner’s drug use was producing a mental illness that led him or her to
pose a danger to others within the prison. These rules instruct that in all but
extraordinary circumstances, and only after findings that comply with due process,
prison authorities would be acting unlawfully if they were to compel a prisoner to
take a pharmacotherapy drug against his or her will. Unless a prisoner is dangerous
to others or is determined to be mentally incompetent, he or she has a right to refuse
pharmacotherapy drugs and a right to give informed consent before receiving them.
ii. Parolees and Probationers
In addition to the roughly two million Americans currently serving time behind
bars, an additional 4.8 million Americans are on parole or probation.159 The
overwhelming majority of people charged with violating federal or state drug
prohibition laws are placed on probation, rather than incarcerated.160 The United
States Supreme Court has held that the purpose of probation in criminal cases is to
provide a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of an offender.161 Most
states have laws that require sentencing courts to impose various conditions on
probationers conditions that must be satisfied in order to successfully complete
probation and thereby avoid spending time in custody. So long as they are
reasonably related to rehabilitation and are not blatantly unconstitutional, relatively
few limitations exist on a trial judge’s discretion to impose particular probation
conditions. As one law professor noted:
Courts have quite accurately described the scope of the sentencing court’s
discretion as “breathtaking,” and commentators have observed that any
legislative limitations on that discretion are “conspicuously absent.” One
recent media account suggested that the content of special conditions “is
limited only by the sentencing judge’s imagination.”162

158
“[M]ental illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence.” (PAUL
S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHIEL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 220
(2d ed. 1991).
159
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Statistics: Summary Findings, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004); Bureau of Justice
Statistics , Prison Statistics: Summary Findings, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
prisons.htm (last modified Apr. 24, 2005); see also Bureau of Justice Statistics , Corrections
Statistics: Summary Findings, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005) (“In 2003, 6.9 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on
parole at yearend 2003 -- 3.2% of all U.S. adult residents or 1 in every 32 adults.”).
160

Lauren E. Glaze & Seri Palla, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the
United States, 2003, BJS Bull. No. NCJ 205336 (July 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs
/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf.
161
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Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).

Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals
for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (2000)
(footnotes omitted).
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People granted probation in drug cases are routinely required to waive their
Fourth Amendment rights by agreeing to be searched at any time, submit to regular
and sometimes random drug testing, and successfully complete a drug treatment
program.163 Considered in light of the federal government’s acknowledgment that
“compassionate coercion also uses the criminal justice system to get people into
treatment,” some future court will almost assuredly attempt to impose
pharmacotherapy as a condition of granting probation to a defendant in a drug case.
There is precedent.
In 1992, the FDA approved a long-acting contraceptive device containing
synthetic progestin medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) hormones. Manufactured
by Pfizer, Inc., it is sold under the trade name Depo-Provera®. It is typically
injected into a woman’s buttocks or upper arm and renders her temporarily sterile for
up to three months.164
Researchers discovered that MPA also had effects on men. When injected into a
man, MPA accelerates the metabolism of testosterone while also suppressing its
production. The result is a reduction of up to seventy-five percent in the amount of
testosterone in the man’s body, thus “lowering the intensity of inappropriate sexual
cravings and the frequency of unacceptable erotic preoccupations.”165 Its use in men
is not without side effects, some of which include:
increased appetite, weight gain of fifteen to twenty pounds, fatigue,
mental depression, hyperglycemia, impotence, abnormal sperm, lowered
ejaculatory volume, insomnia, nightmares, dyspnea (difficulty in
breathing), hot and cold flashes, loss of body hair, nausea, leg cramps,
irregular gall bladder function, diverticulitis, aggravation of migraine,
hypogonadism, elevation of the blood pressure, hypertension, phlebitis,

163
See SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, The Dasis Report: How Men and Women
Enter Substance Abuse Treatment (Sep. 2001), http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/2k
1/enterTX/enterTX.htm (“For men, the most frequent source of referral to drug treatment is
through the criminal justice system. [In 1998], [s]ome 39 percent of men, compared to 25
percent of women, entered treatment as the result of a judicial process . . . . Sixty-two percent
of adult men entering treatment for marijuana abuse were sent by the criminal justice system .
. . .”).
164

American Academy of Family Physicians, Depo-Provera: An Injectable Contraceptive,
available at http://www.familydoctor.org/handouts/043.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
165
Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medical, Ethical and Legal
Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 233, 235 (1989); see also Berlin &
Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders With Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization,
Review of Treatment Modalities, and Preliminary Findings, 138(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 604
(1981); see also Letter From Public Citizen Health Research Group to Connecticut DepoProvera Task Force (Oct. 17, 1983), at p. 8 (The Connecticut Department of Correction
appointed a study group to consider the use of the drug for male sex offenders in 1983, but the
committee rejected the proposal primarily because of the committee’s “very real concerns
about the safety of this drug.”); see also Pierre Gagne, Treatment of Sex Offenders With
Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 138(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 644 (1981) (stressing that MPA
therapy treatment be undertaken only with the patient’s informed consent and that it be
accompanied by counseling); see also People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 315-316 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984).

2004-05]

NEUROCOPS: THE POLITICS OF PROHIBITION

251

diabetic sequelae, thrombosis (leading to heart attack), and shrinkage of
the prostate and seminal vessels.166
While for some men suffering from an unhealthy obsession with sex, voluntary
use of MPA could prove helpful, but use of MPA quickly expanded beyond
voluntary use. California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, and Oregon
have all passed chemical castration statutes.167 While these statutes vary, most
provide a legislative authorization for court-imposed MPA injections as a probation
condition for certain sexual offenses.168 Similarly, while Norplant is considered very
reliable and many women use it voluntarily, use of Norplant did not remain
exclusively voluntary for long. Less than one month after Norplant received FDA
approval, a California court offered a woman a choice between serving a seven-year
sentence for child abuse or serving only one year and having Norplant implanted
while on probation. The woman “chose” Norplant.169 Others have also.170

166

Larry Helm Spalding, Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark
Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 125 (1998) (citations omitted).
167

CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (2005) (permitting MPA treatment for parolees who have
committed specified sex offense); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2005) (providing for administration
of MPA treatment to persons convicted of sexual battery, but medical expert must first find
that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatments and the court order must specify
duration of treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (2004) (giving the Board of Pardons
discretionary authority to administer MPA treatment coupled with mandatory counseling as a
condition of parole for child molesters); IOWA CODE § 903B.1 (2004) (providing that persons
convicted of certain first time sex offenses may undergo hormonal intervention therapy as a
condition of release); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2005) (allowing for the use of MPA as
part of a voluntary treatment plan that convicted sex offenders has to undertake if they are to
receive probation or parole); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2004) (providing for MPA
treatment of sex offenders); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.625 (2003) (establishing pilot MPA
treatment program for certain sex offenders). In addition, in 1996 and 1997, chemical
castration bills were introduced in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. Larry Helm Spalding,
Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
117, 139 n.14 (1998).
168
In 1984, a Michigan judge conditioned a man’s grant of probation in a sexual
misconduct case on the man’s use of Depo-Provera. People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310,
311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
The man appealed, arguing that the condition was
“unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of fundamental rights of liberty,
privacy, bodily integrity, equal protection, and procedural and substantive due process.” Id. at
314. The Michigan Appellate Court reversed the Depo-Provera condition, but did so without
reaching the constitutional issues. Rather, the appellate court held that use of MPA in males
for the purpose of decreasing sex drive “fails as a lawful condition of probation because it has
not gained acceptance in the medical community as a safe and reliable medical procedure.”
Id. at 316. The appellate court also raised concerns about informed consent, noting that both
prisoners and mentally incompetent persons “enjoy a greater degree of protection from
extraordinary medical procedures.” Id.
169

People v. Johnson (Cal. Super. Ct., Tulare County 1991) (No. 29390). The woman’s
“attorney, who had not been at the probation hearing, asked the court to set aside the terms of
the probation in view of [the woman’s] medical unsuitability for Norplant treatment, her
constitutional right to privacy, and the statutory argument that Norplant was unrelated to her
rehabilitation.” Melissa E. Fraser, Note, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization:
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Further, while no reliable information has been found on its prevalence today,
some courts have conditioned a grant of probation for alcohol-related offenses on the
probationer using Antabuse. In the late 1970s, the federal government funded pilot
programs testing the use of Antabuse as a probation condition in some drunk-driving
and public intoxication cases. A total of thirteen county court systems received
funding under the “Demonstration Programs in Antabuse.”171 A law review analysis
of the pilot program found that it was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, cruel
and unusual punishment, and failed to comply with the requirements for informed
consent.172 The article concluded that “[b]ecause Antabuse’s effects are highly
invasive, and because the judicial context of such programs is inherently coercive,
courts should not employ the drug at all. Instead they should adopt rehabilitation
schemes . . . that attempt to re-educate alcohol offenders without the use of drugs.”173
As noted earlier, informed consent requires, at a bare minimum, adequate
information about the possible risks and benefits of a given medical treatment, as
well as an environment free of coercion. A criminal courtroom is an unlikely venue
for satisfying either requirement for informed consent. Few judges, prosecutors,
probation officers, or defense attorneys have the medical knowledge, training, or
time necessary to make the required advisements to the defendant for each particular
pharmacotherapy drug, let alone to assess the defendant’s own unique healthcare and
treatment issues. Thus, a defendant who is offered probation on the condition that he
or she undergo pharmacotherapy will likely be placed in the position of having to
make a medical treatment decision without the appropriate information, thereby
vitiating informed consent. Further, being forced to choose between incarceration
and “medical treatment” with a pharmacotherapy drug is inherently coercive.174
There are very few things that people will avoid more than going to jail or prison.
Any alternative to loss of physical freedom, separation from family and friends, and
loss of employment and income, will have an undeniably attractive appearance. It is
hard to see how such an inherently coercive situation—one that essentially forces a
Controlling Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 207 (1998) (citations
omitted). The Judge refused to reconsider the condition, and on appeal, the merits of the
condition were not discussed because the woman was found to have violated her probation by
using drugs. Id. Thus, the Norplant condition was moot on appeal. Id. See Birth Curb Order
Is Declared Moot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23; see also Matthew Rees, Shot in the
Arm: The Use and Abuse of Norplant. Involuntary Contraception and Public Policy, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Washington D.C.), Dec. 9, 1991, at 16.
170
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person to barter his or her natural neuro- and biochemistry in exchange for
freedom—is compatible with the requirements of voluntary and informed consent.
b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” and many
state constitutions provide independent protections.175 Every citizen of the United
States, whether free, incarcerated, on parole, or on probation, is protected by the
Eighth Amendment.
However, because the Eighth Amendment’s protection only pertains to
“punishment,” future advocates for compulsory pharmacotherapy within the criminal
justice system will likely aim to characterize pharmacotherapy as “rehabilitative” or
“treatment-oriented” in nature, in an effort to distinguish it from “punishment.”176
Although the term “pharmacotherapy” linguistically implies that the drugs provide
“therapy” or treatment, it would clearly be superficial to conclude on that basis alone
that they are not subject to analysis under the Eighth Amendment. Neither the
industry moniker “pharmacotherapy” nor a future legislative statute as authorizing
“therapy” or “treatment” via use of such drugs is conclusive in determining whether
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights have been implicated.177
The therapeutic value of pharmacotherapy as a coercive “treatment” for illegal
drug use has yet to be determined, let alone accepted within the medical community.
Additionally, while voluntary and informed use of pharmacotherapy by prisoners
may well prove therapeutic and rehabilitative, imposing it against a prisoner’s will
may actually be counterproductive. Forced pharmacotherapy precludes a prisoner
from utilizing nondrug methods for coming to physical and psychological terms with
the roots of his or her use of illegal drugs. The effect is to deny the prisoner the
opportunity to build the self-will and self-confidence necessary for sustainable
rehabilitation and to resist problem drug use beyond the prison walls and without the
pharmacotherapy drug. This is true even if the pharmacotherapy is combined with
traditional counseling or talk-therapy.
Pharmacotherapy is also not without side effects. Indeed, it is possible that
ancillary and adverse side-effects alone may render some coercive pharmacotherapy
on prisoners, parolees, or probations “cruel and unusual.”178 Most of the
pharmacotherapy drugs are so new that it has yet to be determined whether they will
175
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Many
state constitutions also provide independent protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
176

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (discussing how only “punishment” is limited
by the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment).
177
Id. at 95 (“[E]ven a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘nonpenal’ would not
alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute.”); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136,
1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that “the mere characterization of an act as ‘treatment’ does
not insulate it from eighth amendment scrutiny,” and that “neither the label which a State
places on its own conduct, nor even the legitimacy of its motivation, can avoid the
applicability of the Federal Constitution”).
178
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (D. Ind. 1972), aff’d, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1974) (holding it is cruel and unusual punishment to inject juveniles in a correctional institute
with tranquilizing drugs that can have significant side effects).
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produce long-term side effects or even what health risks may arise after several
weeks, months, or years of use. Inasmuch as many of the pharmacotherapy drugs
work by targeting parts of the brain, and others work by systemically altering a
person’s metabolism, the health risks associated with their use are potentially
significant. Compelling a prisoner to use pharmacotherapy drugs would force that
person to risk suffering side effects or other serious adverse reactions from the drug.
These side effects will vary from pharmacotherapy to pharmacotherapy, and in some
cases may rise to the level that might be considered psychological and/or
physiological cruelty.
In June 2004, for example, researchers published a case study of a woman who
developed multiple sclerosis following obesity treatment with a CB1 receptor
antagonist.179 In 2003, Roxane Laboratories, Inc., discontinued sale and distribution
of the opioid agonist ORLAAM, as a result of “increasing reports of severe cardiacrelated adverse events.” Given that CB1 receptors are ten times more abundant in
the brain than opioid receptors, the possibilities for adverse events from blocking
CB1 are clearly substantial, and as yet undetermined.
Some pharmacotherapy drugs will undoubtedly receive FDA approval, but for
uses other than treating illegal drug use. For example, Sanofi-Sythelabo has sought
FDA approval for a version of SR141716 that will be marketed under the name
“Acomplia” as an aid for overcoming obesity, overeating, or smoking.180
Compelling a prisoner to use a drug like SR141716 for “off label”181
pharmacotherapy purposes could arguably constitute experimental use, raising
obvious concerns about the law and ethics of using prisoners as human guinea
pigs.182
Here again, the difference between voluntary and informed use by prisoners and
use compelled or coerced by the courts or legislature is critically significant. There
is an unfortunate worldwide history of prisoner-abuse, including within the United
States.183 In the 1920, United States prisoners were routinely labeled as genetically
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Doctors Urge Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A25.
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Because the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, physicians may lawfully
prescribe a medication for uses beyond the scope of the FDA’s approved indication(s). Drug
companies, however, may only advertise a drug for FDA-approved indications. See In
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (observing that “offlabel” use is “an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area
without directly interfering with the practice of medicine.”).
182
See Beck, James M. and Elizabeth D. Azari, 1998. FDA, Off-Label Drug Use, and
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(arguing that “off-label” use of a drug does not constitute experimental use if primarily
employed to benefit the patient).
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For discussions concerning informed consent and medical experimentation on prison
populations, see Vernon H. Mark & Robert Neville, Brain Surgery in Aggressive Epileptics:
Social and Ethical Implications, in 226:7 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 765 (eds. Robert Hunt & John
Arras, 1977); ROBERT M. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 267-71(1977); Barbara
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unfit and then forcibly sterilized. Believing that such sterilization improved society,
approximately 60,000 incarcerated or mentally handicapped people were sterilized in
the United States between 1907 and the mid-1970s.184 The American eugenics
movement reached its zenith in 1927 with the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Buck v. Bell, wherein the Court upheld the sterilization of mentally
challenged women as both constitutional and good for society.185 The highest court
of Maryland recently deplored this unfortunate chapter of American jurisprudence:
“[O]ur own use of prisoners, the institutionalized retarded, and the
mentally ill to test malaria treatments during World War II was generally
hailed as positive, making the war ‘everyone’s war.’ Likewise, in the late
1940’s and early 1950’s, the testing of new polio vaccines on
institutionalized mentally retarded children as considered appropriate.
Utilitarianism was the ethic of the day.”186
The history of homosexuality and the law is also instructive. Until 1973,
“homosexuality” was listed as a psychiatric disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. Up until June 2003, when the United States Supreme
Court declared them unconstitutional, thirteen states had laws making it a criminal
offense to engage in consensual homosexual sex. 187 In some of these states, people
who admitted that they were homosexual or who were “accused” of being gay or
lesbian were subject to involuntary confinement under mental health laws and
subjected to “reparative therapy” designed to forcibly convert them into
heterosexuals.188
“Treatment,” in addition to counseling, included penile
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Chauncey, The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160
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plethysmograph (PPG) shocks (electronic shock triggered by penile erection) and
forced drugging. Some state laws even permitted the forcible sterilization of
homosexuals.189 Drug use, like homosexuality, has a ubiquitous presence throughout
history and across cultures.190 Like homosexuality, drug use and drug prohibition are
subjects of contention and controversy. The discussion of these topics is often
influenced by ignorance, fear and avoidance, conflicting moral and religious dogmas,
and contrasting political aims. History has a way of showing that the forced
“treatments” of today, may tomorrow be seen as cruel, unusual, and even barbaric
punishment.
Although there are several interpretive camps constellated around the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, as punishment, it is hard to conclude that coercive
pharmacotherapy is anything other than cruel and unusual.191
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits
of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique
outside of the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect.192
There are few images more chilling to civilized standards than government
agent’s force-injecting a mentally competent nondangerous prisoner with brainchanging drugs. Blocking a person’s brain receptors with a pharmacotherapy drug
because their crime was filling those receptors with an illegal drug, harkens back to
archaic Biblical notions of retributive punishment such as “eye for an eye, tooth for a
tooth” and forward to a “neuron for a neuron.” Using a drug to block specific
receptors in a prisoner’s brain is like injecting a thief with a drug that paralyzes his
or her hands, or like injecting a Peeping Tom with a chemical that causes cataracts.
It is overbroad and akin to torture or barbarism. Brain receptors, like eyes and teeth,
have far more “legal uses” than those that are forbidden. All these uses would be
disrupted or denied by imposing on prisoners the crippling chemical effects of
coercive pharmacotherapy.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the state has long had the power to restrain a person’s body (e.g.
handcuffing arms and legs or imprisonment), the compelled use of pharmacotherapy
would open chilling new dimensions in the power relationship between citizens and
their government. Compulsory use of pharmacotherapy would signal a striking
expansion of the state’s policing mechanisms on at least two new fronts. First, from
external policing to internal policing, and second, from restraining a person’s
physical body and behavior to directly restraining a person’s brain function and
thought processes. Such a dramatic extension of government power would be
unprecedented.
In Stanley v. Georgia,193 the United States Supreme Court struck down a Georgia
law that banned the private possession of obscene material. “Our whole
constitutional heritage,” explained the Court, “rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds.”194 Justice Harlan, concurring in
United States v. Reidel, characterized the constitutional right protected in Stanley as
“the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from governmental programs
of thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms of permissible
state objectives.”195
If “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of given government
the power to control men’s minds,” as made clear by the United States Supreme
Court, then our whole constitutional heritage must likewise rebel at the thought of
giving government the power to compel a person to use a pharmacotherapy drug – a
drug designed and intended to lockdown certain receptor sites in the brain.
Inasmuch as one’s thoughts and thought processes are the very core of one’s
individuality and the root of both freedom and responsibility, permitting the state to
forcibly pierce a person’s body to insert a pharmacotherapy drug that is designed to
patrol or police that person’s body for the purpose of controlling possible brain
states, grants the state the ultimate power over the individual’s body and mind. Such
an action should be seen as implicating the interests in bodily integrity, privacy, and
freedom of thought - a combined interest in the person that ought to require the very
highest imaginable justification to breach. A lesser standard is incompatible with a
democracy built upon the premise of individual freedom and limited government.
Sixty years ago the United States Supreme Court opined, “[f]reedom to think is
absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control
the inward workings of the mind.”196 This is no longer the case. Pharmacotherapy
drugs give the government that power. Tyranny over the mind is no longer beyond
the reach of the government. The question for the future is whether the government,
in its naïve quest for a drug-free world, can resist that tyrannical power.
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